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ABSTRACT 
Corporate governance reform is an important aspect of broader reforms aimed at 
securing an environment attractive to both domestic and foreign investors and that 
enhances the benefits of investment to society. Of particular relevance is the relation 
between corporate governance practices and the increasingly international character 
of investment. If a country decides to reap the full benefits of the global capital 
market, and if it decides to attract long-term patient capital, good corporate 
governance arrangements must be credible, well understood across borders and 
adhere to internationally accepted principles. 
Equally important is the underlying importance of institution building for developing 
countries. In most cases poverty goes hand in hand with the lack of proper 
institutions, a vicious circle of mismanagement, inefficiencies, expropriation and 
corruption. The lack of properly functioning State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) as 
institutions or corporations, impacts directly on growth by limiting the availability of 
debt and equity investment. It also impacts on the distribution of income within a 
society. With more transparency and accountability the directors and executives will 
have less of an opportunity to fatten their bank accounts at the expense of all the 
other stakeholders and the society as a whole. 
 
The review of corporate governance reforms done in this research includes statutory 
reforms, development of codes of conduct and best practice, and institutional 
reforms will give a better evaluation of South Africa‘s corporate governance reforms 
within its own SOEs structures that will be judged against internationally accepted 
standards to consider the best interests of South Africa and its citizens. The positive 
and negative consequences that can stem from strengthening corporate governance 
regulations and assist in determining the best possible model for South African 
SOEs will form part of the recommendations of this research. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
1.1 Introduction 
The main aim of the government of South Africa in establishing a large number of 
State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) or state corporations since 1920 was to shape the 
country‘s economy. The primary goal of this establishment was to strengthen the 
import-substitution industries which started to grow during World War I, by providing 
infrastructure improvements and basic materials.1 The Electricity Act, No 42 of 1922 
created two institutions i.e. the Electricity Control Board (ECB) and the Electricity 
Supply Commission (Escom). Escom was given statutory powers to establish 
generation and distribution undertakings to supply electricity at the lowest possible 
cost.2  
In 1927 the Pact government (coalition between the National Party and the Labour 
Party) enacted new legislation, which led to the creation of the state-owned South 
African Iron and Steel Industrial Corporation Limited as it was known as in Afrikaans, 
Suid Afrikaanse Yster and Staal Industriele Korporasie.3 The new company, which 
adopted Iscor as the shortened form of its name, quickly took control of the country‘s 
nascent steel industry including USCO‘s Vereeniging site and later Newcastle Iron 
and Steel Works as well.4 Iscor at the outset was controlled by English-speakers and 
moderate Afrikaners not affiliated with National Party.5 
Another State Own Enterprise (SOE) that followed suit was ―the South African Coal, 
Oil and Gas Corporation (Sasol) which was established in 1950 as part of the 
process of industrialization that the South African government considered essential 
for its economic development and autonomy‖.6 The fact that South Africa had no 
domestic oil reserves made the country extremely vulnerable to disruption of 
supplies coming from outside, albeit for different reasons at different times.7 
                                                          
1 US library of Congress ‘Role of Government’ http://countrystudies.us/south-africa/63.htm ( accessed 10 March 2015) 
2 Ebarhard A ‘The political economy of power sector reform in South Africa, working paper # 6’ http://www.gsb.uct.ac.za (accessed 10 
March 2015) 
3 Pederson J P ‗International Directory of Company Histories Vol. 57’ http://www.Fundinguniverse.com/ company- histories/ iscor  limited ( 
accessed 10 March 2015) 
4 Pederson 2004 107 
5 Pederson 2004 108  
6 Pederson JP ‘International Directory Of Company Histories’ http://www.Fundinguniverse.com/ company- histories/ sasol-limited ( 
accessed 10 March 2015) 
7 Pederson J P ‘ International Directory of Companies Histories’ http://www.Fundinguniverse.com/ company- histories/ sasol-limited 
(accessed 10 March 2015) 
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Again in 1951, the South African government‘s Industrial Development Corporation 
(IDC), the state-owned financing institution, created another company called Foskor 
(then ―Fosfaat Ontginnings Korporasie‖).8 What began as a single mining operation 
with the sole purpose to make South Africa independent from any phosphate 
imports, has spent the past 50-plus years quickly growing and developing into a 
reputable and highly profitable producer and processor of phosphate rock 
concentrate, phosphoric acid and granular phosphate based fertilizer.9 
During those periods the majority of corporate directors were appointed by the 
National Party government whilst the appointment of personnel working for these 
state owned enterprises were left to senior management to make decisions 
independent of government control.10 The government's primary control over state 
corporations was by granting or withholding loans of state money. The electricity 
state owned enterprise, Eskom, was however allowed to raise money publicly, but 
most other state owned enterprises relied on government funds for capital funding.11 
By 1980 poor economic performance of State-Owned Enterprises, combined with 
broader economic and political pressures on the apartheid state, caused government 
to look at reforming these institutions.12 The National Party government had partially 
given up the notion of import-substitutional development and tried to achieve 
economic development through export – orientated industry.13This led to ―the 
intention to start the privatization process in South Africa as was first announced by 
the former State President, P. W. Botha on the 5th of February 1988‖.14The first four 
public enterprises that were identified for privatization were South African Iron and 
Steel Industrial Corporation Limited (Iscor), Phosphate Development Corporation 
(Foskor), the South African Transport Services (later known as Transnet) as well as 
the South African Post Office (SAPO) and Telecommunication (Telkom) Services.15 
The public view on the President‘s announcement was that the large foreign loans 
were called in and cut off in 1985 and left the State corporations with serious capital 
                                                          
8 The African Business Journal ‘ Foskor’ http://www.tabj.co.za/mining/foscor_sa.html ( accessed 09 Marc 2015) 
9 The African Business Journal ‘ Foskor’ 
10 US library of Congress ‘Role of Government’ http://countrystudies.us/south-africa/63.htm ( accessed 10 March 2015) 
11 US library of Congress ‘Role of Government’  
12 Eberhard A ‘The political economy of power sector reform in South Africa , working paper # 6’http://www.gsb.uct.ac.za (accessed 10 
March 2015) 
13 Watkins t, Valley S & Alley T ‘Privatization in South Africa under the Nationalist Party Government’ http://www.applet-
maic.com/southafrica.htm ( accessed 12 March 2015) 
14 Parker D and Saal D International Handbook on Privatization ( 2003) 293 
15 Parker D and Saal D 2003 293 
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shortages. This was also viewed as a strategy by international communities to force 
the National Party government to reform their political landscape.16 
The transition to democracy in the 1990s forced Sasol to search for products that 
could prove more competitive in the global marketplace, and as of the new 
millennium Sasol is focusing primarily on its petrochemical business, as well as on 
efforts to convert natural gas into crude oil.17 Deregulation and the end of 
government protection made it clear that the company would no longer be able to 
survive on the profits from its synthetic fuel business.18 In 1995 Sasol joined forces 
with the German chemicals firm Schumann, giving the joint company control over 
one-fifth of the international wax market, and its 1998 acquisition of AECI made it the 
third largest producer of explosives in the world.19 
 
It was only in 2004 that a firm decision was taken by South African government to 
retain ownership of key SOEs and those SOEs were given strategic economic 
mandates by the state to guide their strategies and business plans.20 Infrastructure 
SOEs were also instructed to establish aggressive investment programmes. These 
were later expanded upon to support the needs of a growing economy, rather than 
what their balance sheets could comfortably accommodate.21 This took place in the 
absence of any formal government policy relating to the role of SOEs or their 
capitalisation. 
 
Malherbe and Seagal drew the conclusion that the context of South African 
corporate business until 1994, had a decisive impact on economic developments in 
South Africa. 22The issue of access to capital markets, as well as the efficient use of 
capital by firms in the economy was central and the structure of the corporate firm 
has an impact on corporate governance and therefore the reform of legislation and 
                                                          
16 Parker D and Saal D International Handbook on Privatization (2003) 293 
17 Pederson JP ‘International Directory Of Company Histories’ http://www.Fundinguniverse.com/ company- histories/ sasol-limited ( 
accessed 10 March 2015) 
18 Pederson JP sasol-limited  
19 Pederson JP sasol-limited 
20 Ritchken E ‘The Evolution of State Owned Enterprises in South Africa’ Workshop on State-Owned Enterprises in the Development 
Process (2014) 2 
21 Ritchken E 2014 2 
22 OECD Development Centre Corporate Governance in Developing Economies and Emerging Economies (1999) 2 
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regulations, listing rules and accounting standards play an important role in 
corporate governance reform.23 
 
The current picture of the corporate governance situation in South Africa shows that 
the country is receiving international recognition for its high standards of corporate 
governance while at the same time observers raise serious concerns about 
corruption and the rule of law.24 On the other hand SOEs straddle the divide between 
a corporate and public environment, and therefore have their very own dynamics.25 It 
is for this reason that the critical issue to be touched upon is the evaluation of 
corporate governance reforms that took place within South African SOEs to describe 
its key features and whether the reforms by its nature improved the performance of 
these SOEs. 
 
An analysis of the major corporate governance reforms is done in this research 
including statutory reforms, development of codes of conduct and best practice and 
institutional reforms. The global principles of corporate governance are examined 
concerning how they can serve as models for enhancing corporate governance 
standards in South African SOEs. The analysis is based on the need to evaluate 
South Africa‘s corporate governance reforms within its SOEs structures against 
internationally accepted standards to consider the best interests of South Africa and 
its citizens. 
 
1.2 Problem statement 
Different opinions that arose, the political aspects involved, the strategy pursued to 
promote the reform, and the model that finally prevailed had a bearing in the shape 
and form of corporate governance within SOEs. The cultural changes in the business 
and financial community that came with the implementation of the new regulation 
and the principal effects that the new legislation had on the South African market had 
a great deal of impact in the management of the SOEs. 
 
                                                          
23 Diamond G & Price G The political economy of corporate governance reform in South Africa (2010) 57 
24 Centre for Corporate Governance in Africa. Rating corporate governance of state owned enterprises report. (2012) para 1 
25 Centre for Corporate Governance in Africa. 2012 para 3 
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Following the end of apartheid, several corporate governance-related reforms took 
place to promote more transparent corporate ownership.26 Legislation was enacted 
regarding insider trading, multiple directorships and director liability. Self-regulation 
also played a role in modernising the corporate governance framework. The first 
version of the King Code on corporate governance was released in 1994, 
constituting at the time a real innovation for an emerging economy. 
 
The empirical tests show that better corporate governance is highly correlated with 
better operating performance and market valuation.27 The manner in which SOEs 
relates to other stakeholders, how they fulfill their obligations and how they report on 
the performance will also form part of this research. 
 
1.3 Research question 
The main reason for this research is to determine whether the shareholder value 
proposition as a means for corporate governance reforms will provide the best 
framework for governing these SOEs in South Africa? 
1.4 Objectives of the research 
The main objectives of this research are to:- 
(a) Draw attention to the potential importance or impact of better SOEs 
governance;  
(b) Analyse the legal and regulatory framework of SOEs, ownership function, 
relationships with respective industry, the stakeholders and shareholder 
perspectives on corporate governance, their compliance with legislative 
prescripts, their performance, transparency and disclosure, and the role of 
the board of directors;  
(c) Provide an overview of the powers of governance organs within SOEs with 
reference to good corporate governance principles; 
 
                                                          
26 Habbard P Corporate Governance in South Africa ( 2010) 12 
27 Klapper  L. F & Love I Corporate Governance, Investor Protection, and  Performance in Emerging Markets,(2002) 2818 
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(d) Interrogate whether such reforms did inspire the improvement of corporate 
standards and behaviour; and  
 
(e) Scrutinise the positive and negative consequences that can stem from 
strengthening corporate governance regulations and assist in determining 
the best possible model for South African SOEs.  
 
1.5 Significance of research 
 
In evaluating this topic the following issues will be taken into consideration, the 
contrast between shareholder and stakeholder models, and the divergence between 
U.S. and U.K. approaches to corporate governance locating a South African 
approach in context of the Anglo-American model. The King reports and whether a 
possible ―African‖ model of corporate governance can emerge, and the role of 
international and domestic factors in shaping South Africa‘s ongoing reform process 
will be examined. 
Some of the available literature has revealed that corporate governance of SOEs 
including research work that has been conducted by the Centre of Corporate 
Governance in Africa has confirmed the need to improve the governance structures, 
processes and mechanisms existing in SOEs. It is against this backdrop that a 
research on this topic from those sources will provide a possible remedy for good 
corporate governance for SOEs. 
The research proposes to link corporate governance to productivity analysis within 
SOEs. Productivity considers how the entities are efficient in maximising outputs 
from inputs. Using productivity measures to examine whether good corporate 
governance mechanisms improve capacity utilisation and growth is therefore 
relevant.28 
 
Four SOEs that were established since 1920, that is Escom which was established 
in 1920, Iscor which was established in 1927; Sasol which was established in 1950 
and Foscor that was also established in 1951, had a responsibility of infrastructure 
                                                          
28 Nanka-Bruce D Corporate Government, Capacity Utilisation and Growth (published Doctoral Thesis, University of Barcelona, 2006) 33 
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improvements and the supply of basic materials have been selected as a case study 
in this research to determine the patterns of cause and the effect that determined the 
processes of corporate governance reforms. 
1.6 Methodology 
Given that this research will examine the corporate governance reforms in South 
African SOEs, it is logical to state that this research is exploratory in nature. Many 
variables are not known in regard to the success of some of these SOE‘s corporate 
governance practices especially with regards to their relationship with shareholders 
and their governance structures. 
Using a qualitative approach incorporating case study, legislation, journals, articles 
and written research papers is essential in analyzing the processes in the corporate 
governance. The goal is to find the success factors of the holding company model 
and see the applicability of the context to South Africa. 
The comparative analyses of the history, rationale and significance of the reform, the 
scale and scope of the SOE with other countries such as USA, UK and Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member countries, is vital to 
obtain an overall overview on the implementation and execution of the principles 
used to serve as a context for South African analysis.  
1.7 The structure of the research 
The research is broken down into six chapters. The first Chapter which is the 
introduction focuses on problem statement, research objective, significance of 
research and research methodology in order to present the purpose statement of the 
research. Chapter two covers the overview of good corporate governance which 
entails definition of corporate governance, structure and principles of corporate 
governance, theories of corporate governance, shareholder and stakeholder 
perspective of corporate governance and current regulatory framework on corporate 
governance. Chapter three present an overview of the SOEs which covers the 
establishment and role of SOEs, performance of these SOEs and the role of the 
State as shareholder to provide .Chapter four focuses on code for compliance as a 
measure of good corporate governance. The compliance levels, determinants of 
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compliance levels, international evidence and South African evidence are part of the 
discussions under Chapter four. Chapter five gives a comparative international 
examination with an analysis of the divergence between U.S. and U.K. approaches 
to compare it with South African approach. Chapter six concludes the research and 
recommendations are then proposed in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
OVERVIEW OF GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
“With the wave of impressive corporate financial scandals of the 1980s and 1990s, corporate governance codes were 
designated as a response to encourage company managers, shareholders, stakeholders and controlling agencies to mind their 
corporate etiquette in order to prevent or, at least lessen the impact of such scandals in the future.” Bas Steins Bisschop29 
2.1 Introduction 
Good Corporate governance promotes fairness, openness, and transparency in its 
responsibilities to stakeholder, inherently corporate governance practices facilitates 
economic efficiency by focusing on value-enhancing activities and aids efficient 
allocation of scarce resources.30 This is achieved when corporations efficiently 
employ their assets, attract low cost capital, meet societal expectations and improve 
overall performance.  
Corporate governance matters a lot for national development especially in 
developing countries as it has the potential to increase the economic growth of the 
country. The focus on the deliberation of the history of corporate governance in this 
chapter is to understand the evolution of corporate governance in bringing about 
meaningful change in the society within which we live. The definition of corporate 
governance as another topic of the discussion will be focused in understanding the 
different models of corporate governance which can best suit South Africa. The 
analyses of the structure and essential principles of corporate governance, which 
affects the process, systems, practices and procedures that are used to determine 
corporate direction and performance, will be discussed in this chapter. Examination 
of the formal and informal rules that govern institutions, the manner in which these 
rules and regulations are applied and followed will help to achieve the desired 
objectives of this research. 
2.2 History of corporate governance  
The history of corporate governance correspondingly extends back at least to the 
formation of the East India Company, the Hudson‘s Bay Company, the Levant 
Company and the other major chartered companies launched in the 16th and 17th 
                                                          
29 Bisschop B S Integrity and transparency as fundamental notions of Good Governance but are they enforceable (2014) 1 
30 Mohamad S & Sori Z M ‘An overview of corporate governance: some  essentials’(2011) http. www.ssrn.com (accessed 10 March 2015) 
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centuries.31 The East India Company (EIC) was a precursor of the modern 
corporation working in a globalized world.32 The corporate model which emerged 
during the early years of the EIC is of a collective of trader-investors who combined 
their efforts and resources to seek common economies of scale beyond their 
individual reach.33 The members elected some of their own as officers to manage the 
day to day affairs reporting to the governing body of the General Court.34 The 
manner in which the said companies were managed is a result of a set of habits, 
procedures, and techniques that were developed at the time, being linked to a 
nation‘s culture and society. Nick Robins confirms that the East India Company 
pioneered the model of the corporation that we see today. He further states that its 
innovations included the shareholder model of ownership, and the administrative 
framework of the modern firm.35 
 
In South Africa, the King Report or ―King I‖ or ―codes‖ on Corporate Governance was 
the report that first institutionalised and published the concept of Corporate 
Governance in South Africa in 1994. The said report established and recommended 
standards of conduct for boards and directors of listed companies, banks and certain 
state-owned enterprises and emphasised the need for companies to become a 
responsible part of the society in which they operate.36 This report offered to 
companies and state-owned enterprises, for the first time, a coherent and disciplined 
governance framework that was relevant to local circumstances and offered practical 
guidance.37 The King Committee has no official mandate (unlike nearly all other 
similar initiatives in other countries), and thus its recommendations are self-
regulatory.38 
 
2.3 Definition of corporate governance 
There is no single accepted definition of corporate governance. Humera Khan 
defines corporate governance as the broad term that describes the processes, 
customs, policies, laws and institutions that directs the organizations and 
                                                          
31 Cheffins B R The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Governance (2013) 46 
32 Dodija D Emergence of Corporate Contract Set, Governance and Accountability (2008) 2 
33 Dodija D 2008 2 
34 Dodija D 2008 35 
35Robins N The corporation that changed the world (2006) 19 
36 Ramani Naidoo An essential guide for South African companies (2002) 2 
37 Armstrong P , Segal N & Davis B Corporate Governance South Africa, a pioneer in Africa (2005) 14 
38 Armstrong P , Segal N & Davis B 2005 14 
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corporations in the way they act, administer and control their operations.39 He adds 
to say that corporate governance also enhances the long term shareholder value by 
the process of accountability of managers and by enhancing the firm‘s 
performance.40 Khan‘s conclusion is that the effective corporate governance reduces 
the ownership and control problems and draws a clear line between the shareholder 
and manager.41 
Dr Elaine Sternberg gives a definition of corporate governance very much in favour 
of a shareholder perspective. She defines corporate governance as the mechanism 
by which corporate actions, assets and agents are directed at achieving corporate 
objectives established by the corporation‘s shareholders.42She went further to 
distinguish different forms of corporate governance, audit procedures, information 
disclosure requirements that are appropriate for different forms of 
organisation.43Ultimately, it is the responsibility of the shareholders to ensure that the 
management use the assets of the company to fulfil corporate objectives.44 
 
Sir Adrian Cadbury defines corporate governance as the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled.45 In terms of this definition, the main 
objective of corporate governance is to ensure that the investments of those who 
supply a company with finances are increased exponentially. Therefore, the extent of 
a shareholder‘s interest in a company is determined by the amount of shares which 
he or she holds in the company.46 This also means that when a director engages in 
corporate decision making, the director is only obliged to consider the interest of 
shareholders, disregarding the interest of other stakeholders, which include 
employees and suppliers. This approach to corporate governance is considered to 
be the narrow approach to corporate governance.47  
 
                                                          
39 Khan H A literature review of corporate governance (2011) 1 
40 Khan H A literature review of corporate governance (2011) 1 
41 Khan H A literature review of corporate governance (2011) 4 
42 Sternberg E Corporate Governance Accountability in the Marketplace (2004) 10 
43 Sternberg E Corporate Governance Accountability in the Marketplace (2004) 11 
44 Sternberg E Corporate Governance Accountability in the Marketplace (2004) 11 
45 Cadbury A Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance Final Report and Code of Best Practice (1992) par 2.5 
46 Mongalo T ‘Self Regulation versus Statutory codification: Should the new regime of corporate governance be accorded statutory 
backing?’ (2004) Journal of Contemporary Roman Dutch Law 265  
47 Mongalo T ‘Self Regulation versus Statutory codification: Should the new regime of corporate governance be accorded statutory 
backing?’ (2004) Journal of Contemporary Roman Dutch Law 266  
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Ramani Naidoo defines corporate governance as an essential practice by which 
companies are managed and controlled.48That encompasses the creation of an 
ongoing monitoring of a system of checks and balances to ensure a balanced 
exercise of power within a company, the implementation of a system to ensure 
compliance by the company with its legal and regulatory obligations, the 
implementation of a process whereby risks to the sustainability of the company‘s 
business are identified and managed within agreed parameters and the development 
of practices which make and keep the company accountable to the broader society 
in which it operates.49In defining corporate governance, she includes responsible 
leadership as essential to corporate governance and as such leadership includes 
being transparent, answerable and accountable towards the company‘s 
stakeholders. She continues to emphasise that corporate governance aims at 
achieving a balance between economic, social, individual and collective goals, 
seeking to align as closely as possible the interests of individuals, the company and 
society as a whole.50 Her definition of corporate governance leans towards 
stakeholder model meaning that the firm‘s overall performance does not only result 
from the particular power of the groups or individuals. The firm will perform well if all 
the stakeholders are satisfied and gratified for their contribution to the firm‘s overall 
performance. 
 
Failed energy giant Enron, and its bankrupt employees and shareholders, is a prime 
argument for the importance of solid corporate governance. Sound corporate 
governance reduces risk, adds value to investments, and avoids reputational risks 
for investors. Aspects of corporate governance are the rights of shareholders and 
other interest groups such as the employees, how powers are shared and exercised 
by the directors, and how the holders of powers in a company should be held 
accountable for their omissions and actions.51  
 
The perceived cost of good corporate governance practices justifies the results.52 
The concerns about the perceived cost of good corporate governance is a growing 
consensus that good corporate governance improves the long-term sustainability of 
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companies by reducing risks and increasing access to capital.53 That basically 
means the presence of an effective corporate governance system, within SOEs or 
private companies across an economy as a whole, helps to provide a degree of 
confidence that is necessary for the proper functioning of a market economy. An 
increase of shareholder activism and public demand for accountability require that 
companies have good corporate governance procedure in place.54 Poor corporate 
governance can contribute to SOEs failures, which can in turn pose significant public 
costs and consequences due to their potential impact on any applicable systems and 
the possibility of broader macroeconomic implications, such as taint risk and 
negative impact on their productivity.  
 
2.4 Theories of corporate governance 
The theory of corporate governance is frequently described in terms of two 
apparently opposing models which are the shareholder and stakeholder models.55 
The difference between these two models reflects different theories of the 
corporation. Shareholder theory was originally proposed by Milton Friedman when 
he stated that the sole responsibility of business is to increase profits.56 This theory 
is based on the premise that management is hired as the agent of the shareholders 
to run the company for their benefit, and therefore they are legally and morally 
obligated to serve their interests. He continues to say that there is one and only one 
social responsibility of business to use its resources and engage in activities 
designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which 
is to say, engages in open and free competition without deception or 
fraud.57Friedman‘s statements reflect three fundamental assumptions that lend 
support to the shareholder view of the firm. The first is that the human, social, and 
environmental costs of doing business should be internalized only to the extent 
required by law. All other costs should be externalized. The second is that self-
interest as the prime human motivator. As such, people and organizations should 
and will act rationally in their own self-interest to maximize efficiency and value for 
society. The third is that the firm is fundamentally a nexus of contracts with primacy 
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going to those contracts that have the greatest impact on the profitability of the 
firm.58 
The shareholder theory also found expression in the case of Dodge v Ford Motor 
Company, whereby the shareholder value was highlighted by the Court as a 
business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of 
stockholders.59 With the primary emphasis on the stockholders‘ interest, the 
managers were censured for not meeting the requirement of operating the company 
as a business corporation according to the charter. The concept of shareholder value 
theory, also known as ―shareholder primacy theory‖ or ―shareholder wealth 
maximization‖ has been pervasive and determined as the aim of large public 
corporations, certainly as prominence since 1970s.60 The shareholder value has 
been created to protect the remuneration of shareholders who are considered as the 
real owners of companies. As ―the shareholders receive residual earnings in the form 
of dividends by virtue of their contract‖ which may be reinvested in companies, 
nonetheless, the share might come back to the central agent not by its origin.61  
On the other hand, this also links to the agency theory which is radically discerned 
that ―the managers or directors are agents for the investors or shareholders as 
beneficiaries or principals‖ since they are conferred with the principals‘ money and 
powers to generate profits and increase the value of investment for their investors.62 
Nevertheless, in practice, it hardly implies that the objective of the company is to 
manage in the exclusive interest of its shareholders.63 Since the objectives and 
targets of the shareholders and the benefits of the managers may be in conflict, 
naturally the managers may make decisions that benefit them the most which may 
not be the most profitable choice for their investors. 
Berle also argues in favour of the shareholder primacy norm. He stated that directors 
hold the property of shareholders in trust for the sole benefit of the stakeholder 
debate and directors‘ fiduciary duties. The exclusive obligation of directors was 
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therefore the maximisation of shareholders‘ property.64 He based his argument of 
trusteeship on the fact that shareholders are owners of a company. Director‘s 
obligations to shareholders are based on their role as trustees or agents of the 
shareholders. He therefore classified a company in terms of the separation of 
ownership and control. 
The shareholder theory is now seen as the historic way of doing business with 
companies realising that there are disadvantages to concentrating solely on the 
interests of shareholders.65 The role of the shareholder theory can be seen in the 
demise of corporations such as Enron and Worldcom where continuous pressure on 
managers to increase returns to shareholders led them to manipulate the company 
accounts.66 In summing up the dominant views on corporate governance and 
courses of most business schools support the perspective that the sole purpose of 
business in our community is profit. Business acting beyond its economic concerns 
is at best misguided and is misallocating and/or misappropriating societal 
resources.67  
Many of the more strident critics of the shareholder theory seem to claim that as 
executives are charged with maximizing shareholder value and are given large 
incentives to do so through stock options or other schemes, they will respond by 
embracing whatever manipulations are necessary to achieve that goal.68 But the 
theory clearly dictates that the pursuit of profits should be done legally and without 
deception, and there is little wiggle room for the kinds of overtly illegal behavior 
alleged in many recent financial scandals.69 
The shareholding corporate governance model is usually common in the UK, US and 
other commonwealth countries. Central to the shareholding corporate governance 
model is the doctrine of shareholder value and primacy.70 It suggests that a firm must 
be run to primarily advance the interests of its owners. This is based on a basic 
assumption that ownership is separate from control in an Anglo-American mode. in 
this corporate governance system, the providers of capital (owners/shareholders) 
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surrender the day-to-day management (control) of the business to a group of 
managers consisting of a ‗unitary‘ board of directors and executive management, 
who are frequently not owners of the corporation themselves. Of close relevance is 
that through multiplicity of shareholders, ownership in this corporate governance 
model is quite often relatively widely diffused.71 
 
A major implication from dispersed ownership is that the power of shareholders to 
exercise control over the way their business is run is greatly impaired.72This raises 
the agency problem. However, the agency theory suggests that since shareholders 
(principals) have to delegate the control of their business to a few directors and 
managers (agents) to run the company on their behalf, there is a potential risk that 
directors and managers will pursue their own interests to the detriment of the 
eventual owners‘ shareholders.73By contrast, the shareholding model rejects external 
interventions and additional obligations imposed on corporations by government and 
central authorities because it may distort free market operations. This implies that 
shareholders can easily either transfer their capital from a poorly-governed company 
to a better-governed one or a poorly-governed company may be acquired by a 
better-governed firm through the inherent efficient markets for corporate control. 
 
The shareholding model suffers from several weaknesses generally concerning 
shareholder power and democracy, stakeholder interests, social morality and ethics, 
efficient factor markets, and excessive short-termism.74 Sternberg suggests that 
because executive directors of a corporation are also normally its managers, they 
are less willing to recognise, criticise or correct their own mistakes. Non-executive 
directors‘ accountability to shareholders is also usually impaired by the ways in 
which they are nominated, officially appointed and remunerated.75 
 
On the other hand, stakeholder theorists have criticised the shareholding model on 
two main grounds, firstly that it ignores the social, ethical and moral responsibilities 
of the corporation as an important societal institution; and that it offers a narrow 
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definition of the stakeholders of the firm.76 The stakeholder theorists argue that 
rather than running the firm to primarily maximise the wealth of shareholders77, the 
firm should equally serve the interests of a wider stakeholder group.78 
Edward Freeman, the original proposer of the stakeholder theory, affirms it as an 
important element of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), a concept which 
recognises the responsibilities of corporations in the world today, whether they be 
economic, legal, ethical or even philanthropic.79 According to the stakeholder theory, 
managers are agents of all stakeholders and have two responsibilities: to ensure that 
the ethical rights of no stakeholder are violated and to balance the legitimate 
interests of the stakeholders when making decisions.80 
The stakeholder theory of corporate governance is often found in France, Germany, 
Japan and other European or Asian countries. A central underlying assumption of 
the stakeholding corporate governance model is that the purpose of the corporation 
is to maximise the welfare of a number of stakeholders of the firm rather than those 
of shareholders alone.81 They suggest that a firm consists of social groups in which 
each group can be seen as supplying the firm with important resources 
(contributions) and in return expects its interests to be promoted. For example it is 
suggested that shareholders supply the firm with capital. In exchange, they expect to 
maximise the risk-adjusted return on their investments. Creditors provide the firm 
with loans. In return, they expect their loans to be repaid on time. Local communities 
supply the firm with location and local infrastructure. In exchange, they expect the 
firm to improve their quality of life. Managers and employees provide the firm with 
time and skills. In return, they expect to receive a sustainable income, and this has 
been argued to be true for every reasonably conceivable constituency of the firm.82 
 
The theory states that a company owes a responsibility to a wider group of 
stakeholders, other than just shareholders.83A stakeholder is defined as any 
person/group which can affect/be affected by the actions of a business. It includes 
                                                          
76 Blair M Ownership and control: rethinking corporate governance for the twenty-first century (1995)2 
77 Freeman R E and Reed D L Stockholders and Stakeholders: A New Perspective on Corporate Governance (1983) 25 
78 Berle A and Means G Background and Perspectives on Corporate  (1932) 8 
79  Freeman R E, Managing for Stakeholders. In Ethical Theory and Business (2009)8th Edition 56 
80 Smith, H. J ‘The shareholders vs. stakeholders debate’(2003) 44(4)MIT Sloan Management Review, 85 
81 Blair M M Ownership and control: rethinking corporate governance for the twenty-first century (1995) 7 
82 Hill CWL and Jones TM Stakeholder-Agency Theory Journal Management Studies (1992) 134 
83 Corp Admin ‘Shareholder & Stakeholder Corporate Governance’ http://www.corplaw.i.e/blog ( accessed 12 May 2015) 
 
 
 
 
- 18 - 
 
employees, customers, suppliers, creditors and even the wider community and 
competitors.84The fundamental distinction is that the stakeholder theory demands 
that interests of all stakeholders be considered even if it reduces company 
profitability. Recognition of stakeholder concern is not only good business, but 
politically expedient and morally and ethically just, even if in the strict legal sense 
they remain directly accountable only to shareholders.85 
 
There is a growing awareness that ownership, control and the monitoring of 
management of business organisations are significant variables in explaining firm 
performance and in the protection of stakeholders. This was echoed by Dodd when 
he argued that directors serve as trustees for the entire community rather than for 
shareholders only. Therefore, directors should use the company‘s resources to 
address the interests of a wider variety of stakeholders. By doing so, directors would 
behave in a socially responsible manner.86  
 
Hawley & Williams went further in their literature review of corporate governance 
which was undertaken in 1997 in the US for the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), wherein they identified two other models/ 
theories that has an influence on corporate governance, that is, the finance model 
and the political model. The political model recognises that all allocation of corporate 
power, privileges and profits between owners, managers and other stakeholders is 
determined by how governments favour their various constituencies.87 According to 
Hawley & Williams the political model of corporate governance has had immense 
influence on corporate governance developments in the last five years to seven 
years. They say that firms have also been influential in moulding the US 
political/legal/regulatory system over the last few centuries.88 
 
In other words, the shareholders are the best suited to guide and discipline 
managers in the conduct of their powers and duties. Moreover the operation of 
corporations would be well-run as “both the managers and the non-executives are 
fully accountable to shareholders for what they do in running the corporation’s 
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business. The shareholders absolutely have the rights to intervene the business 
operation as well as other lawful rights which are not bestowed on stakeholders if the 
managers or directors breach their duties. Accordingly, a shareholder can bring 
derivative actions against the managers and directors. 
 
South Africa‘s principal corporate governance report aspires to an inclusive 
approach to corporate governance, in which companies are clearly advised to 
consider the interests of a variety of stakeholders.The purpose of the corporation 
should be defined in the broader sense than the mere maximisation of shareholder 
welfare.89 Hillman and Keim describe the stakeholder theory from a strongly 
instrumental view in testing relationships among shareholder value creation, 
stakeholder management, and the corporation‘s participation in social matters. 
Building better relations with primary stakeholders like employees, customers, 
suppliers, and communities could lead to increased shareholder wealth by helping 
firms develop intangible, valuable assets which can be sources of competitive 
advantage and is what Hillman and Keim advocates.90The said theory warrants that 
the design of the institutions should make managers internalise all stakeholder‘s 
welfare. These stakeholders should include employees, suppliers and customers. 
The essence of the theory is that the outcome may not only depend on the choices 
made by one person, but also on the strategies selected by other participating 
parties.91Ethical treatment of stakeholders will benefit the company because trust 
relationships are built with stakeholders. In order to achieve the maximum efficiency 
in the costs of social association the long-term contractual associations between a 
company and its stakeholders are necessary.  
 
2.5 Structure and principles of corporate governance  
Governance is concerned with the process, systems, practices and procedures, 
formal and informal rules that govern institutions, the manner in which these rules 
and regulations are applied and followed, the relationships that these rules and 
regulations determine or create, and the nature of those relationships.92 In analysing 
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a corporate governance system, one must understand the environment in which a 
company operates; the country‘s legal framework; the local culture, history and 
organisation of society; and the roles of the capital market and other active market 
forces.93 It is risky to classify governance systems into bad and good, developed and 
undeveloped, mature and immature because organisations in various countries 
operate in different environments with different economic traditions and cultures, so 
there can be no one solution to fit all.94  
 
Good corporate governance is founded upon the following principles: 
a. Shareholder recognition: Good corporate governance seeks to make 
sure that all shareholders get a voice at general meetings and are 
allowed to participate. A shareholder with a controlling interest is able 
to influence decisions of the company in controlling the composition of 
the board of directors. 
Good corporate governance seeks to make sure that all shareholders 
get a voice at general meetings and are allowed to participate. 
Shareholders of corporations should jointly and severally protect, 
preserve and actively exercise the supreme authority of the corporation 
in general meetings.95They have a duty, jointly and severally to 
exercise that supreme authority of the corporation. 
 
b. Stakeholder interests: Stakeholders are groups and individuals who 
can affect or be affected by the organisations‘ purpose.96Stakeholders 
are also defined as individuals and constituencies that contribute either 
voluntary or involuntary, to its wealth-creating capacity and activities, 
and who are therefore its potential beneficiaries or risk bearers.97There 
are different stakeholder groups in a company who happen to have 
either direct or indirect interest in the company.98  
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The balance of power between different stakeholder groups and the 
way in which power is exercised are key in corporate governance.99The 
success of a company depends on how the company handles the 
interest of its non-shareholder parties. Taking the time to address non-
shareholder interests can help the company to establish a positive 
relationship with the community and whoever has a potential to 
influence the growth of the company.  
 
c. Board responsibilities: must be clearly outlined to majority 
shareholders. All board members must be thoroughly cultured on their 
strategic role, purpose, mission and vision of the company. Over and 
above giving strategic direction to the company, the board must 
delegate executive powers to the managing directors or chief executive 
officer. Managing directors or the chief executive officer‘s primary 
responsibility is to safeguard and protect the interest of the 
shareholders.  
 
The common law imposes both a fiduciary duty and a duty of care and 
skill on directors. The 2007 South African Companies Bill (the ‗2007 
Bill‘) initially proposed to codify directors‘ duties, and now the 2008 Act 
partially codifies both the fiduciary duties and the duty of care and 
skill.100 The fiduciary duties that directors owe their company require 
that they act in good faith and for the benefit of the company.101 These 
duties are based on the ‗general principle that a person standing in a 
fiduciary relationship to another commits a breach of trust if he acts for 
his own benefit or to the prejudice of the other‘.102 
 
d. Ethical behavior violations in favor of higher profits can cause massive 
civil and legal problems. A code of conduct regarding ethical decisions 
should be established for all members of the board. With effective 
corporate governance based on core values of integrity and trust, 
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reputational value companies will have competitive advantage in 
attracting and retaining talent and generating positive reactions in the 
marketplace, if you have a reputation for ethical behavior in today‘s 
marketplace it engenders not only customer loyalty but employee 
loyalty.103  
 
The new realities of corporate governance show that no entity or agent 
is immune from fraudulent practices and have altered the way 
companies operate; they have re-defined the baseline for what is 
considered prudent conduct for businesses and executives.104Byrne 
also noted that in the post-Enron, post-bubble world, the realization that 
many companies played fast and loose with accounting rules and 
ethical standards and which allowed performance to be disconnected 
from meaningful corporate values, is leading to a re-evaluation of 
corporate goals, values and purpose.105 
 
Young and Thyil contends that corporate governance is founded on a 
system of ethics or the sets of relatively shared values and norms that 
are expressed and negotiated106 Whilst Fleming and McNamee states 
that corporate governance principles are concerned with moral 
philosophy, values and norms of behaviour that guide a corporation‘s 
behaviour within society.107In this vein, Rossouw advances the concept 
of ‗‗the governance of ethics‘‘ as a concept that captures the manner in 
which the organization is ethically governed and includes, amongst 
other things, the development of codes of ethics and rules of conduct, 
the training of boards of directors and staff with regard to ethics, and 
the undertaking of ethics audits.108 
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e. Business transparency is the key to promoting shareholder trust. 
Transparency means openness, a willingness by the company to 
provide clear information to shareholders and other stakeholders.109 
For example, transparency refers to the openness and willingness to 
disclose financial performance figures which are truthful and 
accurate.110 
Transparency and disclosure are essential elements of a robust 
corporate governance framework as they provide the base for informed 
decision making by shareholders, stakeholders and potential investors 
in relation to capital allocation, corporate transactions and financial 
performance monitoring.111 
f. Efficiency and effectiveness: Effective corporate governance promotes 
the efficient use of resources both within the company and the larger 
economy. As such when corporate governance systems are effective, 
debt and equity capital would flow to those corporations capable of 
investing it in the most efficient manner for the production of goods and 
services most in demand, and with the highest rate of return.112 In this 
regard, effective governance helps protect and grow scarce resources, 
and helps ensure that societal needs are met.113 In addition, effective 
governance should make it more likely that those managers who do not 
put scarce resources to efficient use, or who are incompetent or at the 
extreme corrupt, are replaced.114 
 
g. Accountability: It also means that all role players must be held 
accountable for their actions or omissions. This principle provides for 
the support of the system‘s corporate engagement and governance 
initiatives to achieve long term sustainable risk adjusted investment 
returns.115 The directors should be accountable to shareowners and 
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management accountable to directors.116 To ensure this accountability, 
directors must be accessible to shareowner inquiry concerning their key 
decisions affecting the company‘s strategic direction.117 
  A consistent and coherent legal and regulatory framework is also key 
aspect of ensuring accountability of both the State acting as owner and 
the SOEs themselves, in that it establishes a clear division of 
responsibilities, objectives and expectations. An ownership policy, 
specifying the purpose of state ownership and the expectations of the 
State should be a prerequisite to providing individual SOEs with clear 
objectives, both commercial and non-commercial, and so that the 
government, acting as owner, is guided by a consistent and coherent 
approach.118  
h. Sustainability: is about promoting ethical responsibility, sound corporate 
governance practice, providing safe working environment in which the 
health of employees is protected, minimising adverse environmental 
impacts and providing opportunities for social and economic 
development within the communities that the company operates.119 
This principle integrates the balance of three pillars which are economic 
growth, social responsibility and the responsibility for the environment. 
Profitability and growth create jobs and wealth and on the other side 
companies will continue to provide products and services that people 
will need. 
2.6 Current regulatory framework on corporate governance in South Africa 
a. The growth of corporate governance in most major economies of the world 
has seen the establishment of various legal and regulatory regimes which are 
aimed at controlling, supervising and managing how corporations are 
governed. In South Africa the main regulation that concern corporate 
governance is the Companies Act, 2008 (Act 71 of 2008). 
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The reforms that were also introduced in South Africa includes stringent rules 
and requirements by the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) as the self-
regulators of the equity market; innovation in disclosure and transparency 
which is to solve conflicts of interest among the stakeholders of corporate 
governance. 120 
 
b. Common Law 
The South African common law relating to companies arose primarily as a result 
of judicial interpretation of the Act and the general body of company law, and 
draws extensively on English legal precedent.121 According to it a director is 
subjected to the fiduciary duties to act in good faith to the benefit of the company 
as a whole and to avoid a situation where the director‘s personal interest 
conflicts with that of the company. 
c. Companies Act, 2008 (Act 71 of 2008) 
 
The Companies Act and Regulations plays a key role as the first legislation that 
included the corporate governance framework in its statute book. The Act 
prescribes a number of governance requirements that seeks to ensure that 
South African companies are in tune with the changing business trends and 
development. Furthermore, the Act also brings about the importance of the 
corporate environment in South Africa to keep pace with international 
developments and trends to ensure that new business initiatives and company 
expansions can take place in South Africa. The companies Act directly provides 
clear a framework for the empowerment of stakeholders and includes a directive 
that companies operate to enhance not only shareholder profits but also social 
welfare.122 
 
The Act as compared to the previous company legislation in South Africa 
introduces the concept of the company as a means of achieving economic and 
social benefits. Stakeholder protection is addressed in section 76(3)(b). 
Furthermore section 72(4) provides for the establishment of a social and ethics 
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committee. Chapter 2, Part C deals with the general transparency and 
accountability requirements. Enhanced requirements are furthermore listed in 
chapter 3. This is, however, only applicable to certain companies. 
The specific position of directors, prescribed officers, the company secretary, 
auditors and audit committees are also provide for by the Act. The duties of 
directors are partially codified in section 75 and 76. These duties include the duty 
to act with reasonable care, skills and diligence and the duty to disclose personal 
financial interests in matters to be considered by the board. 
The financial regulatory system in South Africa comprises of three main 
components that includes, the regulation of financial instruments, regulation of 
the market in which this instrument is being traded and the regulation of those 
that participated in the market. Furthermore, regulation of financial institutions is 
divided between the South Africa Reserve Bank, the Registrar of Banks, and 
Financial Services Board (FSB). 
 
d. Financial Markets Act, 2012 (Act No. 19 of 2012) 
 
The said Act provides for the regulation of financial markets, licensing and 
regulating exchanges, central securities depositories, clearing houses and trade 
repositories. It further regulates and control securities trading, clearing and 
settlement and the custody and administration of securities. Furthermore it 
provides for the prohibition of insider trading and other markets abuses. The 
implementation of the Act was aimed at increasing confidence in financial 
markets in South Africa so as to promote innovation and investment in South 
Africa market and companies. The reporting obligation on the other hand has 
been widened to encouraged transparency and high standards within 
corporations thereby reducing systemic risk among companies. 
 
e.  King Reports 
 
The King Committee on corporate governance was inaugurated in 1992 and the 
first King Report (King I) on corporate governance was issued in 1994. This 
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report was tailored toward the UK Cadbury Report of 1992.123The King I Report 
comprises the code of corporate practices and conduct and this was the first 
corporate governance Code of firms in South Africa. The king I Report served as 
a reference point for policy makers in the examination and development of legal 
and regulatory frameworks for corporate governance.124 
 
The King 1 Report recommended standards of conduct for boards and directors 
of listed firms such as financial, non-financial and state-owned companies. In 
addition the said Report suggested that all stakeholders should be involved in 
corporate governance practices of firms. It further provided for the main 
principles on corporate governance practice which covered the composition, role 
and guidance on the category for board of directors and non-executive directors. 
The appointments to the board for executive directors and guidance for 
maximum terms for them, determination and disclosure of directors‘ 
remuneration and meetings of board are also covered. Other areas included in 
the said report are the balance of annual reporting, requirements for effective 
auditing, and codes of business ethics.125  
 
The King II report was issued in March 2002; this report consists of new sections 
on sustainability, the role of the corporate board and risk management.126 The 
focus of the said Report was to show that there is a connection between 
economic and societal goal. That basically implies that in shaping corporate 
governance reform in South Africa there is a relationship between economic and 
societal variables. 
 
In March 2010 the King III Report was published. This Report focuses on the 
move from a comply or explain approach to a principle based apply or explain 
approach. The existence of better corporate governance practice in South Africa 
attracts more investors for strong economic development in the sub-
region.127This is similar to the comply and explain basis that King II operated on. 
                                                          
123 Andreasson S The Political Economy of Corporate Governance in South Africa (2007) 
124 Moyo NY South Africa principles of corporate governance : legal and regulatory restraints on powers and remuneration of executive 
directors, (2010) 10 
125 Moyo NY South Africa principles of corporate governance : legal and regulatory restraints on powers and remuneration of executive 
directors (2010)10 
126 Andreasson S The Political Economy of Corporate Governance in South Africa (2007)5 
127 Vaughn M and Ryan  L V Corporate Governance: An International Review (2006) 5 
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The King III committee found the word apply more appropriate than comply. The 
King III Report applies to all entities regardless of the manner and form of 
incorporation or establishment irrespective of whether it is a public, private or 
non-profit sector. 
 
The King III Report recommended that organisations should have an integrated 
report in place of annual reports and as separate sustainability reports in 
according to the Global Reporting Initiative Sustainability Reporting Guideline.128 
In addition, the following are the new principles introduced as part of the 
corporate governance Code in the King III Report IT governance, business 
rescue, and fundamental affected transaction in term of director‘s responsibility 
during mergers, acquisition and amalgamation. There are statutes which involve 
companies and directors that are briefly summarised in the King III Report and 
that includes the Public Finance Management Act and Promotion of Access to 
Information Act.129  
 
King IV report which is scheduled to be published in 2016 will be building on the 
content of King III. The same subject matter will be covered but consideration will 
be given to enhance the executive and directors‘ remuneration, integrated 
reporting, responsible investing and linkage with the Code for Responsible 
Investing in South Africa.130 The evolving role of social and ethics committees, 
mandated audit firm rotation and information security and protection, tendering 
and strategic risks group governance, board diversity and combined assurance 
are amongst other topics that will be addressed in this report.131 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
Throughout history, the corporate form has served as the most appropriate vehicle to 
raise and marshal substantial resources.132Conversely corporate governance is 
claimed to bring about the strength of the control structure of a business, increasing 
accountability of management and maximises sustainable wealth creation. 
                                                          
128 Price Water House Coopers, 2009 
129 Price Water House Coopers, 2009 
130 Terms of Reference of the Draft Code of Good Corporate Governance King IV 
131 Terms of Reference  of the Draft Code of Good Corporate Governance King IV 
132 A D. Chandler, Organizational Capabilities and the Economic History of the Industrial Enterprise(1992) 79 
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Institutional investors believe that better financial performance is achieved through 
better management, and better managers pay attention to governance, hence the 
company is more attractive to such investors.  
 
Good governance is not something that exists separately from the law and it is 
entirely inappropriate to unhinge governance from the law. As far as the body of 
legislation that applies to a company is concerned, corporate governance mainly 
involves the establishment of structures and processes, with appropriate checks and 
balances that enable directors to discharge their fiduciary responsibilities, and 
oversee compliance with legislation. In addition to compliance with legislation, the 
criteria of good governance, governance codes and guidelines will be relevant to 
determine what is regarded as an appropriate standard of conduct for directors.  
The more established certain governance practices become, the more likely a court 
would regard conduct that conforms with these practices as meeting the required 
standard of care. Corporate governance practices, codes and guidelines therefore lift 
the bar of what are regarded as appropriate standards of conduct. Consequently, 
any failure to meet a recognised standard of governance, albeit not legislated, may 
render a board or individual director liable at law. 
The next chapter explores the overview, strengths and potential obstacles of South 
African SOEs by giving specific attention to the role of the state as a shareholder and 
a manager of its assets. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
AN OVERVIEW OF SOUTH AFRICAN STATE–OWNED ENTERPRISES 
“There must be significant role for public sector investment to complement private sector and community participation in 
stimulating reconstruction and development. The primary question in this regard is not the legal form that government 
involvement in activity might take at a given point, but whether such actions strengthen the ability of the economy to respond to 
the inequalities in the country, relieve the material hardship of the majority of the people, and stimulate economic growth and 
competitiveness.‖
133
 
3.1 Introduction 
The management efficiency of SOEs is being widely discussed both nationally and 
internationally. This chapter attempts to explain the state of South African SOEs from 
the perspective of corporate governance reforms and the government‘s master plan 
to improve the situation.  
 
Interesting to this chapter as well is the discussions around the establishment and 
role of SOEs, performance that influenced changes of the SOEs, the model 
describing the change of these SOEs. The adaptation of corporate governance 
principles and take-over of the leading practices based on the approach of historical 
institutionalism and a potential improvement of management efficiency, related to 
implementation of the principles of corporate governance will also be explored. 
Potential obstacles and strengths of SOEs are also discussed in this chapter. 
Specific attention is also given to the role of the state as a shareholder and a 
manager of its assets. Focusing on the question of management efficiency, attempts 
to justify and explain the role of SOEs in the development of national economy will 
be analysed to find an evidence of positive effects related to the implementation of 
corporate governance principles. 
 
Four SOEs that were established since 1920 that is Escom, Iscor; Sasol and Foscor 
which have or had a responsibility of infrastructure improvements and the supply of 
basic materials have been selected as a case study in this research to determine the 
patterns of cause and the effect that determined the processes of corporate 
governance reforms 
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3.2 Establishment and role of Eskom, Iscor, Sasol and Foskor 
By the early 1920s, the Government of South Africa was concerned about the lack of 
standardisation in the power industry and the need to expand capacity to support the 
electrification of the railways and accelerated industrialization.134 Merz and McLellan, 
were commissioned to examine the general question of electricity supply in South 
Africa.135They recommended the need to have a central controlling authority to 
oversee and coordinate the development of the electricity industry. The government 
responded with the Electricity Act, No 42 of 1922, which made provision for the 
establishment of the publicly owned Electricity Supply Commission (Escom). Escom 
was given statutory powers to establish distribution undertakings in cooperation with 
the existing generators to ensure a cheap and abundant supply of electricity.136The 
Electricity Act of 1922 also provided for the establishment of the Electricity Control 
Board (ECB) to regulate electricity supply and issue licences. After the 1973 oil 
crises, diesel and oil-fired generators of municipalities were uncompetitive and the 
energy users switched to electricity as other fossil fuels became very 
expensive.137Electricity demand levels soared higher than ever before. The utility 
was forced to rapidly increase plant orders and to increase prices by 70 per cent 
between 1974 and 1978.138 
 
In the 1990s, further changes were fuelled by the democratic revolution that marked 
the end of the apartheid era in South Africa. A massive electrification programme 
was initiated and the proportion of the population with access to electricity increased 
from one-third to over two-thirds. The Eskom Conversion Bill of 2001 replaced the 
old Eskom Act of 1987 with subsequent amendments. Eskom was converted into a 
public company (named Eskom Holdings Ltd) with its share capital held by the state. 
It now paid taxes and dividends.139A memorandum to the Bill described its purpose 
as bringing about more efficiency and competitiveness in the running of Eskom, 
exposing Eskom to global trends and ensuring that Eskom is run in terms of a 
                                                          
134Eberhard A & Mtepa M ‘Rational for restructuring and regulation of a ‘low priced’ public utility: a case study of Eskom South Africa’ 
(2005)International Journal of Regulation and Governance 77‟ 
135 Eberhard A & Mtepa M ‘Rational for restructuring and regulation of a ‘low priced’ public utility: a case study of Eskom South Africa „ 
(2005)International Journal of Regulation and Governance 77‟ 
136 Mallin C A International Corporate Governance: A Case Study Approach (2006) 285 
137 Steyn G Eskom: are we missing the opportunity to learn from history? http://www.gsb.uct.ac/mir ( accessed on 06 October 2015) 
138 Steyn G Eskom: are we missing the opportunity to learn from history? http://www.gsb.uct.ac/mir( accessed on 06 October 2015) 
139 McDonald D Electric Capitalism: Recolonising Africa on the Power Grid (2001) 64 
 
 
 
 
- 32 - 
 
protocol on cooperative governance.140The board of directors was then established 
to provide strategic direction and was answerable to the state and the executive 
management was then responsible for the day to day running of the company.141 
In executing their mandate the executive management warned both the board and 
the government in the late 1990s that Eskom would run out of power reserves by 
2007 unless action was taken to prevent it.142The advice was ignored Eskom was 
marked by power shortages, severe financial losses and electricity price rises that 
pushed up South Africa's inflation rate under the leadership of Mr Jacob Maroga who 
was the Chief Executive Officer of Eskom.143Government failed to heed on the said 
warnings as a result failed to respond to the forecasts given by Eskom. The question 
remains, was there any lack of capacity and expertise necessary for this level of 
corporate governance by the government oversight committee. Nor is the board of 
Eskom free of blame, for it is their duty not just to inform Government but also to take 
every measure to make sure they are heard.144  
The government oversight committee‘s role of oversight in management the potential 
risk was critical in ensuring that Eskom takes the adequate steps to prevent, and 
prepare for, the harms that can result from such negative decision making 
processes. There is no substitution for proper preparation, deliberation, and 
engagement on matters of such national interest. Lessons learnt from these rapidly 
evolving risks include that both the directors and government oversight committee 
should take seriously their obligation to make sure that companies are appropriately 
addressing those risks. 
The OECD Guidelines highlighted some of the main challenges affecting SOEs 
which are, limited autonomy as a result of political interference, major threats of 
takeover and bankruptcy, diluting accountability and undermining SOEs‘s financial 
discipline. Accountability is diluted by the complex chain of government ownership 
which can be exercised through many different governmental entities with differing 
                                                          
140McDonald D (2001) 64 
141 Khoza R J and Mohamed Adam M The Power Of Governance, Enhancing the Performance of State-Owned Enterprises (2007)8 
142 Terblanche S State- Owned Enterprise, Telkom Latest Casualty amongst troubled SOEs published 12 November 2012 on Leadership 
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priorities, such as Parliamentary review committees, the President‘s office, Ministry 
of Finance, sectoral ministries and state audit agencies.145 
 
What Eskom board of directors needed in that case was full autonomy to exercise 
their full responsibility and the authority required to give strategic guidance without 
fear or favour. Not only that, the boards also needed to feel empowered to fulfil their 
duties and be capable of giving objective and independent judgment. This means 
that, they should not act as individual representatives of the constituencies that 
nominated them. That also implies that mechanisms must be established to protect 
them from undue political interference, which could detract them from carrying out 
their duties in the interest of the company and its shareholders. This should be 
viewed as a way for the directors to add value and enhance corporate performance 
rather than to exercise a controller‘s function on behalf of the state. In order to fulfil 
this, boards should act as collegial bodies, and most specifically not act as 
representatives of specific interests.146  
 
This was supported by Shirley when he stated that good performance will only 
happen when political influence with boards is restrained so that the boards are held 
more accountable.147Most successful SOEs have a balance of public and private 
interests and are commercially run without political interference. This was echoed by 
Goldman Sachs MD Colin Coleman when he was addressing the Super Return 
Africa Private Equity & Venture Capital Conference. He said in his address that 
South Africa should follow the Chinese example by modernising its state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) as its current model is no longer working and can no longer be 
financed. He continues further to say that the Chinese government raised about 
$120bn through the flotation of state-owned companies over a 30-year period while 
retaining a controlling stake in them. This gave rise to a new era of high performing 
companies and unleashed the infrastructure programmes so essential to Chinese 
growth and development. He concluded by saying that what was not needed, 
however, was continued political meddling in SOEs.148 
 
                                                          
145 OECD Ownership oversight and board practices for Latin American State Owned Enterprises (2001) 4 
146
 OECD Guidelines on the Governance of State Owned Enterprise for Southern Africa (2014)30 
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Iscor, another state company was established in terms of the Iron and Steel Industry 
Act, 1928 No. 11 of 1928. The objectives of establishing the company were, to 
produce iron and to create employment opportunities.149 The result of that decision 
brought about the erection of a plate mill at Vanderbijlpark. Works was 
commissioned in 1943 mainly for the production of heavy plate for ship repairs and 
the manufacture of armoured cars for South Africa‘s war effort. Directly after the war, 
it was decided to build a fully integrated steel works at Vanderbijlpark, and a start 
was made on this early in 1947. Iscor started trading in 1947. The enactment of the 
Companies Act of 1973 led Iscor to adopt a more corporate organization that allowed 
it to be run in the manner of a private company. Nonetheless, Iscor remained a state-
owned firm until the late 1980s, enjoying its dominant position with up to 85 percent 
of the domestic steel market under its control and protectionist trade policies.150  
In 1985 privatisation was accepted as part of the economic policy in South Africa for 
economic development. Loane Sharp writes that even though privatisation was key 
to real economic transformation it nevertheless should be seen as a means to adopt 
an economic stance that is reliant on a simple dichotomy, narrowing the analytical 
framework to the conflict between the state and the market.151 His assessment of 
privatisation largely overlooks evidence that favours state economic intervention. 
According to the national government, Iscor never lived up to the expectations of its 
master as most of its plants reached their limit of growth. The local and world 
demand of steel also reached is lowest levels. As a result of economic crisis the 
state company did not generate any economic growth and competitiveness. There 
was no need to reform the management of the company hence the decision to 
privatise was credible enough.152 
In 1950 the government appointed a committee to investigate all aspects of 
producing oil from coal.153 The recommendation of the committee leads to the 
establishment of a State-owned company which was formed to take over the 
Anglovaal venture. The committee recommended that the plant be based on the 
Fischer-Tropsch process, employing German reactors to produce diesel fuel, 
                                                          
149 Dr Hendrik Johannes van der Bijl an electrical engineer and industrialist who was the chairman of Iscor in 1941 
150International Directory of Company Histories, Vol. 57. St. James Press, 2004 http://www.iscor.com (accessed 06 October 2015) 
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lubricants, chemicals and waxes, and the plant designed by the Kellogg Corporation 
to produce petrol. 154 
Government accepted these recommendations. In September 1950, Sasol was 
formally incorporated as a State-owned company under the unwieldy name of the 
South African Coal, Oil and Gas Corporation (Sasol). Its directors were appointed 
either directly by the government or by the parastatal Industrial Development 
Corporation (IDC), through which the government channelled capital for the 
enterprise. It took South Africa down an increasingly lonely road as world 
disapproval of apartheid deepened. It also, however, demanded that South African 
industry develop its own skills and production capability, rather than rely on overseas 
experts and factories. Industrialists responded enthusiastically; Sasol was not an 
isolated case of courageously taking on the unknown. What distinguished Sasol from 
other South African adventurers was that it set out to create an industry that existed 
nowhere else in the world.155 
 
In the1970s when the oil crisis drove up oil prices, the increasingly isolated apartheid 
state considered energy security a priority and instructed Sasol to build two more 
CTL plants. Construction was ‗fast-tracked‘ when the Shah of Iran, a key ally and 
South Africa‘s largest supplier of crude oil, was overthrown.156 Although privatised in 
1979, Sasol remained close to the state both before and after the political transition 
to majority rule with the state-owned Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) 
retaining a major shareholding.157 
 
In 1990 South Africa went through two major changes, one was the end of white 
supremacy and the other had to do with international trade and tariff barriers. 
Industries that had previously been heavily protected against imports by the 
Nationalist government, under its policy of promoting economic diversification, were 
suddenly exposed to the bracing wind of international competition.158  
 
The link between Sasol and the state remains tight. The state portrays Sasol as a 
paragon of innovation and hence as a key national asset for industrial development. 
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It has become a global technology leader, linked into global production networks 
through partnerships with a range of leading transnational and state-owned 
corporations.159Sasol‘s power as a key supplier of energy in South Africa, and its 
historically close ties to government, have given it a privileged position, allowing it to 
influence government, not only at a national level, but also globally. It uses this 
position to promote what it sees as profitable opportunities created by climate 
change, while working to protect its core business interests, profiting from dirty fossil 
fuels.160 
 
Sasol applies sound corporate governance structures and processes, which the 
board considers pivotal to delivering sustainable growth in the interests of all 
stakeholders. Sasol‘s values-driven culture and code of ethics underpin its 
governance structures and processes, committing the company to high standards of 
business integrity and ethics in all its activities. Governance structures and 
processes are reviewed regularly, and adapted to accommodate internal 
developments and reflect national and international best practice.161Sasol is a good 
example of a company that has implemented controls to provide reasonable 
assurance of its compliance with all relevant requirements in respect of its listings.  
After the Second World War, the possibility of phosphate mining was investigated as 
a matter of strategic importance.162 Eventually, in 1951 the State acquired the 
necessary claims from Dr Merensky, and the Industrial Development Corporation 
(IDC) established the Unie-Fosfaat-Ontginningsmaatskappy (Eiendoms) Beperk to 
develop the deposit. A few years later the name was changed to the Phosphate 
Development Corporation Limited and in 1987 to Foskor Limited. Production started 
in 1954 under difficult conditions and the scale of mining operation was too small to 
be economic.163  
Currently, Foskor‘s Board of Directors is responsible to its shareholders for the 
performance of the company. Its role includes the establishment, review and 
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monitoring of strategic objectives, approval of major acquisitions, disposals and 
capital expenditure, and overseeing the Group‘s systems of internal control, 
governance and risk management.164The Board takes overall responsibility for 
Foskor‘s success. Its role is to exercise leadership and sound judgement in directing 
the Group to achieve sustainable growth and to act in the best interests of 
stakeholders.165 
The Board retains full and effective control over the company by monitoring the 
executives in their implementation of Board policies and strategies, as well as by 
setting targets and measuring the company‘s performance on an annual basis. The 
Board is also responsible for ensuring compliance with all relevant laws, regulations 
and codes. The Board Committees assist the Board in executing its duties and 
exercising its powers. The Board delegates to each committee the authority required 
to enable it to fulfil its functions through formal Board-approved terms of reference. 
The Board does not discharge its responsibility by delegating its authority to the 
Board Committees.166 
3.3 The situation analysis of the performance of existing SOEs 
The performance of SOEs operations has been reflected in their financial reports. 
The financial reports are used to compute data which reflects the performance to be 
evaluated by the stakeholders. The concern over their performance now comes at a 
time when government is experiencing a social and financial crisis and some of the 
SOEs have become obstacles to the resolution of macro-economic problem. The 
situation is serious in that government has called for a review of their mandate.167 
Adele Thomas reported incidences of corporate governance transgressions at five 
strategic SOEs. Transgressions for each SOE were documented against the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development‘s framework of best 
practice in governance for SOEs by reviewing annual reports and newspaper article 
citations over a two-year period.168  
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Such transgressions include: 
 
a) Poor leadership, evident in conflict between the Chairman and CEO, 
senior leadership vacancies and a lack of succession planning, 
instability in executive leadership, delays in senior appointments and 
political appointments and cronyism, 
b) Inappropriate rewards including excessive pay and benefits to 
executive managers and board members in spite of SOE 
underperformance, 
c) Mismanagement of resources evident in poor long-term strategy 
development, poor financial accountability and fruitless or wasteful 
expenditure and 
d) Board irregularities demonstrated in apathy or ignorance of company 
affairs, irregular attendance at meetings and excessive concurrent 
board appointments, lack of adherence to fiduciary duties, bribery and 
corruption, conflicts of interest, tender-rigging, and lack of regular 
board appraisal.169 
 
Her findings were that, while political intervention in the operational running of each 
SOE is apparent, government appears not to have fulfilled its oversight role of 
ensuring the sound governance of SOEs according to best practices.170 These 
incidence themselves demonstrate that lax regulatory institutions, standards, and 
enforcement can have huge implications for the economy and for the public. 
 
These concerns over South African SOEs corporate governance standards are so 
clear that the status quo is no longer acceptable. The low productivity growth of 
SOEs, low profitability and increasing losses and fiscal subsidies to loss making are 
an ongoing problem. It will not help government to inject massive amounts of capital 
into these ailing SOEs without proper interventions. The creation of a modern 
enterprise system a diversified form of ownership that would compete on equal terms 
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in the market place may assist South Africa. Government could benefit from 
articulating a plan that will/should include the following171: 
(a)  limiting the scope and size of traditional state enterprises.  
(b)  Some of the small SOEs being converted into non-state owned 
enterprises.  
(c) Encouraging some SOEs to merge and labour forces to be redeployed, 
and 
(d) Transforming ailing SOEs into autonomous commercial institutions. 
3.4 The role of the state as shareholder  
 
The lack of any real comprehensive legislative definition of national or provincial 
state owned entities in our statute books is another challenge. The State‘s ownership 
interest in SOEs is represented by Government through different institutions: 
Shareholder Minister/ Municipalities. Currently in South Africa there are three 
spheres of Government and those are the national, provincial and local government. 
All Government spheres with the exception of local government have the power to 
create statutes,172and it is through these statutes that most, if not all these 
institutions have established SOEs through which some of the programmes of these 
Government institutions are driven. These statutes are referred to as founding Acts/ 
legislation of these public entities. Over and above these founding Acts there are 
other laws that apply to SOEs. 
Currently there are over 300 publicly owned SOEs across all levels of government. 
The eight major public companies are under the oversight of the Department of 
Public Enterprises (DPE), and one of them being Telkom is listed on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) which is under the oversight of the Department 
of Communications. At the sub-national level a number of SOEs and parastatals are 
active in a broad range of activities, of both a commercial and non-commercial 
nature. The economic importance of SOEs is concentrated in the top 30 companies, 
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with four accounting for 91 per cent of the assets, 86 per cent turnover, and 77 per 
cent of SOE employment.173  
 
South African corporate governance with regard to SOE‘s is applied through the 
precepts of the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) which encapsulates the 
principles contained in the King Reports on Corporate Governance. Governance 
oversight over SOEs vests in the Boards of SOEs, the Executive and Parliament.  
 
(a) The Board of Directors : 
The Board of Directors of SOEs is the governing body of the SOEs. The 
Board has absolute responsibility for the performance of the SOEs and is fully 
accountable for the performance of the SOEs. Governance principles 
regarding the role and responsibility of SOEs Boards are contained in the 
PFMA and the Protocol on Corporate Governance. 
 
King III recommends that the Board should have an approved Charter that 
sets out the roles, duties and responsibilities of the Board as well as salient 
corporate governance principles. The role of the Board should include 
amongst other things the following activities: 
• Providing strategic direction and leadership; 
• Determining the goals and objectives of the company; 
• Approving key policies including investment and risk 
  management; 
• Reviewing the company‘s goals and strategies for achieving its 
  objectives; 
• Approving and monitoring compliance with corporate plans, 
  financial plans and budgets; 
• Reviewing and approving the company‘s financial objectives, 
  plans and expenditure; 
• Considering and approving the annual financial statements and 
  notices to the shareholder; 
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• Ensuring good corporate governance and ethics; 
• Ensuring that the Shareholder‘s performance objectives are achieved and 
that this can be measured in terms of the performance of the SOEs; 
• Ensures that the SOEs complies with and is operating in accordance with all 
applicable laws, regulations, government policies and codes of good 
business practice, regulations and instructions prescribed in terms of 
legislation; 
 
(b) Departments : 
SOE‘s are entities through which the Executive Authority delivers services. In 
Most cases the departmental targets would incorporate the service delivery 
targets of SOE‘s that report to their Executive Authorities. The annual 
shareholders‘ compact serves as the agreements between the SOE and the 
Executive Authority to deliver on their mandate.174 
 
(c) The Auditor-General: 
The Auditor-General is a state institution accountable to the National 
Assembly. Section 188 of the Constitution provides that the Auditor-General 
must audit and report on the accounts, financial statements and financial 
management of all national and provincial departments, all municipalities and 
any other institution or accounting entity required by national and provincial 
legislation. 
 
(d) The Executive Authority :  
The Executive Authority which is the Minister of the respective ministry acts as 
shareholder, while the Minister of Finance and the National Treasury is 
responsible for financial oversight. The PFMA gives authority to the Executive 
Authority for oversight powers with particular reference to the corporate plans, 
shareholder‘s compacts and quarterly reports. The Executive Authority also 
has the power to appoint and dismiss the Board of SOEs. It must also ensure 
that the appropriate mix of executive and non-executive directors is appointed 
and that directors have the necessary skills to guide the SOEs. 
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The Executive Authority‘s corporate governance responsibility as shareholder, 
involves ensuring that, from the Board of directors downwards, and also in 
respect of accountability of the Board upwards to the shareholder, all the 
necessary and appropriate corporate governance structures, procedures, 
practices , controls and safeguards are established, properly implemented 
and operate effectively in the SOEs concerned.175 
 
(e) Parliament : 
 
Parliament exercises its role through evaluating the performance of SOEs by 
interrogating their annual financial statements. Section 42(3) of the 
Constitution empowers the National Assembly with the power to scrutinise 
and oversee the executive action. Section 65 of the PFMA requires the 
executive authority responsible for a public entity must table in the National 
Assembly or a provincial legislature, as may be appropriate— (a) the annual 
report and financial statements referred to in section 40 (1) (d) or 55 (1) (d) 
and the audit report on those statements, within one month after the 
accounting officer for the accounting authority for the public entity received the 
audit report; 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
Acknowledging that the South African SOEs have operated within a number of 
operational constraints, a number of improvements could be made. Full executive 
autonomy without political interference, non-conflicting objectives, and organisational 
reform are essential for efficient performance. What could assist South African SOEs 
is the development of explicit plans so that board of directors and executives of such 
SOEs know what is expected of them. Those plans could include economic, social, 
environmental and financial objectives. If executives are given the authority to 
achieve these objectives subject to reporting and monitoring mechanisms being put 
in place, an appropriate reward and sanction mechanisms should be established to 
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enforce good performance. Emphasis should also be given to improving the quality 
of management within the SOEs, rather than resorting to alter the organisational 
forms. Management skills should be enhanced through the appointment of 
successful private sector experts serving on the Boards‘ Advisory Committees. 
 
Full and proper implementation of corporate governance principles can serve as a 
positive influence on SOEs‘ management efficacy. Management transparency when 
properly employed will potentially increase the involvement of society into the 
process of SOEs management and thus have a positive pressure on the executives 
of SOEs to improve the management principles of appropriate organizations 
Financial objectives alone are an insufficient basis for evaluating the performance of 
SOEs the key concern should be efficient management in the face of imperfect 
competition. Social objectives and the traditional values of the public service should 
not be lost in the pursuit of financial objectives. Ministers have a range of social, 
economic, political, and financial objectives as owners of state owned enterprises. 
 
In conclusion, in order to have a viable and competitive SOEs, SOEs need to adopt 
the longer term views of sustainability which encompass numerous stakeholders, 
rather than simply trying to maximise profits. In response to the failings of the current 
SOEs model for trading activities, the recommendation is that the primary aim of the 
State should be to act as an informed and active owner and establish a clear and 
consistent ownership policy, ensuring that the governance of SOEs is carried out in a 
transparent and accountable manner, with the necessary degree of professionalism 
and effectiveness.176 The second recommendation is for an acceptance of an overall 
set of principles to guide the reform of individual commercial SOEs. The third 
recommendation is a determination of a comprehensive review of each State Owned 
Enterprise so that a programme of adjustment is consistent with the approved 
principles. Separating commercial and non-commercial entities can increase 
performance against target rates of return.  
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Compliance as a measure for corporate governance is another tool to be used in 
assessing governance frameworks, practices and behaviours against outlined rules, 
regulations and principles and the said is fully discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
MEASURING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
“in today‟s climate of current disclosure and fairness, there‟s no room for executives to cut corners…executives must certify that 
the information is correct‟ when they sign their company‟s (SEC) filings…if their statements contain material misstatements or 
omissions, they can be exposed not only to civil penalties  and lawsuits, but also to criminal prosecution and prison”
177
 
4.1 Introduction 
The essence of good corporate governance is to ensure that across the 
organisation, all laws and regulations are complied with. This basically requires the 
board to develop effective standards of corporate governance; establish effective 
business systems, financial controls and risk identification and management 
processes.The board must also ensure proper stewardship of the company and hold 
themselves accountable to the company's shareholders. Within the corporate 
structures the role of the board of directors remains crucial. The tone at the top 
determines the tune in the middle. 
 
Existence of appropriate values and standards of business conduct which includes 
transparency, responsibility, fairness and effectiveness throughout the organisation 
breeds good corporate governance and as such nurtures a culture of accountability. 
Good corporate governance involves a lot more of compliance as such this chapter 
covers the compliance levels, the factors that influence the level of compliance of 
corporate governance, international perspective and South African perspective on 
compliance.  
 
4.2. Compliance levels 
Corporate governance is multi-faceted in nature and encompasses company law, the 
regulatory framework, the Listing Rules, the King Codes on Corporate Governance, 
ethical standards, corporate strategy and government policy. Obviously, failure to 
comply with any one of these areas will impact on the perception of corporate 
governance standards. Good corporate governance, however, is more than a set of 
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rules or a code; it is a state of mind and a culture that needs to be embedded from 
government right through to corporate level.178 
The main principle of compliance is for the board to have a balance of skills, 
experience and diversity of perspectives appropriate to the requirements of the 
business they lead. The board should ensure that changes to its composition can be 
managed without undue disruption. There should be a balance on the composition of 
executive and non-executive directors including independent non-executive directors 
so that there is a strong independent element on the board, which can effectively 
exercise independent judgement.179 
There is certainly a demand for accountability and responsibility in corporate 
behaviour. Even though it will take more than just leadership to restore public 
confidence in South African SOEs in order to ensure their ongoing vitality, effective 
government action in the form of robust monitoring or oversight role, independence 
of auditing system, and stepped up law enforcement is needed. Regulatory reforms 
that over-react or address symptoms while ignoring underlying causes can be costly 
and counter-productive. Government‘s task is to restore corporate integrity and 
market confidence without stifling the vitality that underlies a strong economy.180 
 
Dalton and Dalton‘s discovery on compliance level is that in spite of increasing 
legislative measures, there is little evidence that the governance of South African 
SOEs has improved over time. They attribute the lack of progress to a misplaced 
focus where structural aspects of the board of directors for example composition of 
the board and of board committees, CEO/Chairman structure, board size dominate 
over process issues that relate to the tone of the culture and to many of the subtle 
issues that are difficult to clearly measure.181 Highly effective boards include a mix of 
directors with the expertise and experience to fulfill their essential oversight roles. 
Having a board made up of the right people with the relevant skill sets is critical in 
today‘s competitive business environment. 
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Another point that could assist the board in exercising its fiduciary responsibility 
without fear and undue pressure is their sound judgment as guided by integrity, 
observation, experience, insight, and institutional policy. It is not enough to protect 
the institution‘s wealth, the board members should also take cognizance of looking to 
the future and execute their duties with loyalty, faith and trust. They must ensure 
commitment to mission, integrity of operations, and conservation of core values; and 
they must safeguard the institution‘s moral compass. Board members should be 
substantively educated on the institution‘s mission, programs, finances, and 
challenges. They should be open-minded, reflective, and not be narrow-minded. 
Lynn McGregor‘s findings support the study in the sense that most board members 
do not meet the traditional definition of independence due to the nature of their 
appointment.182 That has as such caused compliance level to go down. She 
attributes the problem of the level of compliance with corporate governance structure 
which hinges on the independence of directors, who are supposed to bring 
objectivity to the oversight function of the board and improve its effectiveness. The 
problem is that independent directors cannot play an effective role in isolation 
despite their commitment to ethical practices nor stop a decision that is detrimental 
to the members individually, but if they act collectively, they will be able to act 
prudently before arriving at any such decision.183 Independent directors may not be 
in a position to stop fraud at the highest level, but with a high level of commitment 
and due-diligence they are well placed to identify signals that indicate that everything 
is not as it should be.184 
Dalton and Dalton also suggest that while structure is a prerequisite for board 
effectiveness, it is not sufficient by itself to ensure board success process and 
systems are also important elements for the success of good corporate 
governance.185 Matthew Harris‘s views concurred with the said views in that 
‗adequate system and processes are of vital importance for a company that wishes 
to sustain a high level of Corporate Governance.186He further contends that there is 
an inappreciative amount of reliance on them in the modern day workplace and 
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these requires a demand for more control mechanisms, better communication and 
improved systems to drive efficiency.187 
Disclosure is one of the essential factors that can influence compliance level. It 
provides for the base for informed decision-making by shareholders, stakeholders 
and potential investors in relation to capital allocation, corporate transactions and 
financial performance monitoring.188Management or the executives have as a matter 
of course a very critical role to play in the day-to-day operation of the company which 
includes amongst others the disclosure of material information on the financial and 
operating results of the company, company objectives and foreseeable risk factors to 
the board. The execution of strategies, policies, processes, and procedures that 
have been established by the board ought to be reported to indicate a compliance 
level. 
 
The Cadbury Report added three fundamental principles of corporate governance 
that is openness, integrity and accountability as means to influence 
compliance.189Accountability is regarded as a tool measure corporate performance. 
With it, the confidence of stakeholders is increased. It is achieved through 
faithfulness in various aspects of corporate governance especially reporting. The 
more accountable corporate governors are, the more likely it is that results of 
performance measurement processes are going to be a true and fair representative 
of the performance being measured.190 
 
4.3 The factors that influence level of compliance 
Potential factors of the compliance levels of corporate governance include the 
diffusion of an international benchmark model of good governance, a country‘s legal 
system, the desire to attract foreign investors and the influence of interest groups.191 
Most of the corporate governance best practice codes are of the ―comply or explain‖ 
type, which means that firms need to mention the cause of non-compliance whereas 
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voluntary regulation allows corporations to ignore the non-compliance without 
explanation.192Understanding the fundamentals of corporate governance compliance 
is important to see concrete evidence concerning companies that operate in the 
―apply or explain‟ environment. Another point for noting is that the ―apply or explain‖ 
nature of corporate governance regulation gives more flexibility to companies in 
compliance. Regulatory compliance is another important factor that differentiating 
internal or external mechanisms of corporate governance used to monitor 
managerial accountability.193 
 
The elements of corporate governance compliance reveal that the existence of 
corporate governance regulation is indeed a significant factor in companies 
compliance levels. In fact, the results suggest that firms comply with regulation even 
in the absence of mandatory obligation to comply.194 Long term business operation 
has a significant effect on corporate governance compliance, which implies that 
corporate governance practices increase with the maturity of the company. In 
addition, concentrated ownership also correlates with better corporate governance 
practices with regulation.195 
 
Research has also revealed that corporate governance regulations is positively 
associated with stock exchange listing tenure, business operating tenure and 
concentrated ownership structure of companies, and negatively associated with the 
business operating cycle.196 In addition to regulation, governance practices are also 
reflected in different factors such as culture, traditional financial options, corporate 
ownership patterns and legal origins.197 It is generally accepted that the purpose of 
regulations concerning corporate governance is not to increase the value of 
companies but to enhance the safety of investors. The existences of corporate 
governance regulations are considered as an important factor of compliance. 
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Consequently pressure from the regulatory authorities has a potential of encouraging 
companies to comply with voluntary codes of best practice.  
 
Another factor that increases the possibility of better corporate governance 
compliance with regulations is the concentration of ownership status within 
corporations. Similarly, firms operating for a long time and stock exchange listing 
status of long tenure indicate better compliance with regulations.198 The benefit to 
corporate compliance will encourage accountability and lower earnings management 
that results in effective decision-making information being given to the stock market 
for investors. Investment decisions on the other side will become more effective in a 
regulated corporate governance environment and thus increase investor confidence 
resulting in higher firm value. 
 
Regulations and governance act in a harmonising manner to resolve the problem 
associated with absentee owners. Regulations also reduce management dominance 
in most corporations by increasing the influence of external parties such as auditors 
and shareholders. The said has been validated by Denis when he said that 
regulation serves as the most basic external corporate governance mechanism and 
has received greater attention since the beginning of 21st century.199 He further 
contends that the general regulations and civil laws require the firms to have a 
minimum level of corporate governance structure to operate in a competitive market. 
Kole and Lehn on the other hand affirm this in the sense that firms will not be able to 
exist without corporate governance.200 
 
Himmelberg made other finding which talks to the level of protection as another 
factor that can influence the level of compliance on corporate governance. He says 
that the level of protection that is offered to investors has two components one being 
external one, related to the legal environment where the firm operates (legal 
protection), and the other an internal one, related to the type of activity carried out 
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and to other observable firm characteristics (endogenous protection).201 He 
continues to say that investor protection refers to a collectivity of those features of 
the legal, institutional, and regulatory environment and characteristics of firms or 
projects that facilitate financial contracting between inside owners (managers) and 
outside investors.202 Under this point of view it is possible that firms within a country 
can offer different levels of protection to their investors, due to their operational 
specifications and the different degrees of interest they could have to voluntarily 
adopt better corporate governance practices. 
Katherina Pistor and Chenggang Xu on the other hand raise a point of incomplete 
law as one of the factors that can cause a lack of investor protection. They define 
law as incomplete when law makers are unable to foresee all future contingencies.203 
Securities law and investor protection present a fine example of the incomplete law 
problem.204It is not possible for company and securities law to unambiguously define 
every actionable lack of due care on the part of directors and managers, every 
method a manager or controlling shareholder might use to misappropriate or misuse 
company assets.205Potential harm comes to investors in an infinite variety of 
forms.206They conclude their argument by saying that ‗other means of law-making 
and law enforcement are required to achieve optimal law enforcement.207 They 
suggest that proactive law enforcement combined with the right to adapt rules 
flexibly over time can serve as a solution.208 
 
Enforcement of the regulations, laws on the books or voluntary codes is key to 
effective corporate governance especially at the transitioning and developing 
countries.209Corporate governance and enforcement mechanisms are intimately 
linked as they affect firms‘ ability to commit towards their stakeholders, in particular 
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towards external investors. 210 When the general enforcement environment is weak 
and specific enforcement mechanisms function poorly, as in many developing and 
transition countries, few of the traditional corporate governance mechanisms are 
effective.211 A range of private and public enforcement ―tools‖ can help reduce these 
costs and reinforce other supplementary corporate governance mechanisms. The 
limited empirical evidence suggests that private tools are more effective than public 
forms of enforcement in the typical environment of most developing and transition 
countries.212 
 
The separation of ownership from management raises the issue of monitoring 
managerial activities to ensure investor confidence. Users of accounting information, 
such as investors, government agencies, auditors and financial analysts, have 
focussed on monitoring corporate governance systems.213 This leads to increased 
disclosures about corporate governance, demands for the regulation of systems of 
corporate governance, and consequentially, enhanced internal control 
systems.214Regulators, academics and practitioners around the world now evaluate 
corporate governance regulations and compliance from inception to the 
implementation of a suitable and sustainable system that takes account of the socio-
economic environment relevant to any particular company. 215 
 
Another factor that influence the corporate‘s compliance with corporate governance 
is the role of the independence of directors that includes amongst other things, 
providing valuable advisory role to the corporations they direct. There is a direct 
relation between director‘s independence and thrift survival of a corporation. The 
said corroborates evidence from other studies that shareholders fare better during 
significant corporate events, such as acquisitions, poison pill adoption and corporate 
restructuring, when their firm‘s board is dominated by independent outside 
directors.216  
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4.4 International Perspective 
Since the 17th century, governments have had to regulate limited liability. They had 
to ring fence corporate property from the creditors of individual shareholders and 
vice versa. The institutionalisation of today‘s market economies is a clear difference 
between our time and the earlier regime. This could not have happened without 
public policy intervention; and it will not continue to bear its fruits if policy makers do 
not continuously upgrade the basic rules of company governance, to reflect rapidly 
changing environments.217 
 
The essence of corporate governance is concerned with issues of ownership and 
control of the enterprise.218 Ownership referred to in this context is the legal 
allocation of property rights among the principal stakeholders or corporate 
constituencies that is shareholders, creditors and employees. Control on the other 
side refers to the way in which legal rules and social norms interact to determine the 
balance of power among these groups.219A legal perspective is important in this case 
because of the pivotal role which legal rules play in constituting the corporate form 
and in framing the options available to the various parties with an interest in or 
affected by the enterprise. 
The financial crisis ‗has been a wake-up call‘ to the failings of the current Anglo-
American system of corporate governance.220This has served as an opportunity to 
critically evaluate the current system and the values it represents. A number of 
issues in the governance of financial institutions have been blamed for the global 
financial crisis, including a lack of transparency and reliability, reckless board 
practices and remuneration policies that encourage ‗short-termism‘ and high levels of 
risk taking.221 Arora submits that, due to the pivotal role of financial institutions within 
society, the directors of such institutions must no longer be allowed to possess such 
a narrow focus; centred solely on short term financial success. Instead, the stability 
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of financial institutions must be guaranteed to protect against the economic and 
social fallout of recession.222  
Anglo-American systems were viewed as unfavourable to insider systems because 
corporate control was exercised by agents with permanent economic ties with the 
company.223 However, the separation between ownership and control in public 
companies led scholars to identify the potential agency problems that arise when a 
dispersed group of shareholders are unable to monitor and control the behaviours of 
management.224 It was in the 1980, an era of globalisation, when analysts came to 
an agreement that agency problems can lead to poor corporate governance.225 They 
were of the view that management was effectively shielding itself from 
accountability.226The American model of corporate governance provides a powerful 
legal right to shareholders to call corporate managers to account.227 
Since the late 1970 the Chinese's ‗economic reform policies on the other hand have 
been balanced by the dual objectives of enhancing economic efficiency and 
strengthening the position of the ruling Communist Party. SOE reforms, which began 
thirty years ago, are case in point‘.228 SOEs generally operated less efficiently than 
private firms due to a number of various reasons being that the government provided 
'softer budget constraints' than markets, the policy burden from achieving various 
costly social goals, agency issues; and/or a lack of competition.229 In undertaking 
SOE reforms, policy makers face at least three options: changing ownership mainly 
through privatisation, introducing competition, or managerial and institutional 
reforms.230 Privatisation involves selling off inefficient, unprofitable, or loss-making 
SOEs to non-state owners. While these reforms were designed to tackle the obvious 
inefficiencies inherent in state enterprises, they needed to be done slowly in order to 
preserve China's political and social stability.231 Greater exposure to competition 
requires market-oriented reforms that expand the reach of the market economy, 
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through breaking up state monopolies, removing barriers to entry for non-state 
players and exposing SOEs to market-determined input prices. 232 Their presence in 
national economies was justified on various grounds, including: the necessity to 
provide public goods; regulating or benefiting from natural monopolies; acting as 
'national champions'; and being the fundamental production unit in the case of 
centrally planned economies as in China from the 1950s until the economic reforms 
of the 1980. 
The overhaul of the SOE sector in China occurred from the mid-1990s with a large 
scale sell-off of loss-making SOEs, only partial privatisation was pursued, as the 
government kept the majority stakes in large SOEs. Corporatisation and corporate 
governance reforms include the setting up of internal governance structures, those 
are decision making procedures and standards so that management will have 
incentives to pursue profit and are accountable for their business decisions. In the 
meantime, the Government pushed remaining SOEs towards corporate governance 
reforms and greater exposure to competition.233 China's mixed approach to SOE 
reform also reflects that markets and the broader non-state sector were almost non-
existent when China began its reform process. This is in contrast to Australia and 
other western market economies prior to the programme of de-regulation and 
privatisation of the 1980s, where vibrant markets and market-oriented private firms 
already co-existed with state-owned companies. Instead, the authorities recognised 
that China needed time to develop markets, market-friendly institutions, and market-
compatible norms, ideas, practice, and enforcement.234  
The main key SOE reform objective has been to establish a 'modern enterprise 
system'. The modern enterprise system, as sanctioned in 1993, consists of four 
pillars: clarification of property rights; clarification of rights and responsibilities; 
separation between government administration and corporate business; and 
'scientific' management.235 Over time, a growing number of SOEs have adopted 
modern corporate structures with boards of directors responsible to shareholders 
and for supervising the management of business operations. This has led to the 
                                                          
232 Zhiwu C ‘Capital Markets and Legal Development: The China Case’. (2003) 14 China Economic Review:451 
233 Lin, Justin Yifu, Cai Fang, Li Zhou The China Miracle: Development Strategy and Economic Reform (2003) 5  
234 Lu Litao ‘New thinking on the relations between governments and markets’ http://www.yicai.com/news (accessed on 15 July 2015) 
235 Naughton B ‘Programs of Economic Reform Begin to Emerge in China Leadership Monitor’ http://www.hoover.org/publications/china-
leadership-monitor ( accessed 15 July 2015) 
 
 
 
 
- 56 - 
 
administrative functions being stripped off from SOEs' business operations.236 SOEs' 
corporate governance has also been strengthened through shareholding reforms, 
with a growing number of SOEs being publicly listed. SOEs' ownership structure has 
become more diversified, involving the participation of non-state private and foreign 
firms as majority or minority shareholders.237 These reforms have moved SOEs 
away from being direct affiliates to the central planning system, with the government 
no longer involved in most SOEs' day-to-day operations.238 
 
The New Zealand public reform process of the late 1980 and early 1990 was notable 
for its attempt to clarify public accountability through the specification of outputs, 
contractual agreements and the disaggregation of government departments into 
smaller, more sharply focused agencies.239 While the reforms achieved managerial 
improvements, the accountability regime was less successful because of the 
difficulties of specification and the continuing robustness of Ministerial responsibility 
in the face of attempts to limit the political control and accountability.240 
 
The New Zealand Stock Exchange and Securities Commission on the other hand 
issued the Corporate Governance Best Practice Code of 2003 and Corporate 
Governance: Principles and Guidelines of 2004 in addition to other common laws 
such as the Companies Act 1993.241 Ever since, most of New Zealand companies 
comply with corporate governance regulations even though it is not mandatory to do 
so.242 Evidence was also found of compliance with corporate governance regulations 
being positively associated with stock exchange listing tenure, business operating 
tenure and concentrated ownership structure of companies, and negatively 
associated with the business operating cycle.243 
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4.5 South African Perspective 
Following King II, the Johannesburg Stock Exchange Limited (JSE) introduced the 
requirement that listed companies are required to include in their annual report a 
narrative statement as to how they had complied with the principles set out in King II. 
That will enable various stakeholders to evaluate the extent of the company‗s 
compliance. In cases of non-compliance listed companies are required to state 
reasons for non-compliance to be justified. There are examples of companies listed 
on the JSE that have not followed practices as recommended but have explained the 
practice adopted and flourished. In these examples, the boards have ensured that 
acting in the best interests of the company was the overriding factor subject to 
proper consideration of the legitimate interests and expectations of all the company‗s 
stakeholders. 
Foreign institutional investors have regarded the South African listed companies as 
being among the best governed in the world‗s emerging economies.244This is as a 
result of the JSE listing requirements that follow a good governance practices and 
principles. This was evidence by major capital inflows into South Africa before the 
global financial crisis of 2008. 
King III principles are based on an apply or explain approach. This means that 
directors are legally obliged to act in the best interests of the company. In an apply or 
explain approach, the board of directors could decide that the recommendation 
would not be in the best interests of the company based on valid reasons. The said 
approach is based on the objective of good corporate governance principles of 
fairness, accountability, responsibility and transparency. Explaining how the 
principles and recommendations were applied, or if not applied, the reasons 
therefore, results in compliance. The duty to provide such information does not 
necessarily rely on the ultimate compliance officer or a bureaucrat ensuring 
compliance with statutory provisions, but the stakeholders.  
4.6 Conclusion 
The enforcement of the company law, the regulatory framework, the Listing Rules, 
the King Codes on Corporate Governance, ethical standards, corporate strategy and 
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government policy is an effective measure on the impact of corporate governance 
standards. Corporate governance compliance as one of major factor provides 
additional tool to both the board of directors and the shareholders because it serves 
as an effective monitoring mechanism to reduce the agency conflict. It imposes more 
stringent monitoring and increases the involvement of the Board of Directors in the 
corporate‘s decision making. In cases whereby the corporate governance is not 
binding, corporates‘ decision to adopt the corporate governance codes must be 
supported by prudent justification. 
 
There is much to be learnt from New Zealand and China in an attempt to clean up 
South African failing SOEs. The China‘s new far-reaching SOE reforms in improving 
efficiency, ripping out corruption and boosting its competitiveness through 
transparent reporting, independent boards and adhering to new post-global financial 
crisis investment behaviour regulations for companies has helped in a great deal. 
 
New Zealand ownership reforms of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that clarified the 
state‘s role as owner, reduce fragmentation of ownership responsibilities across 
multiple institutions, and enhance accountability for results can be a lesson for South 
Africa as well. Their reforms were aimed at giving SOE boards and management 
greater autonomy in operational decision making. This is what South Africa needs 
today. The goal should be to separate the state‘s ownership functions from its policy-
making and regulatory functions to sharpen the focus on ownership issues and 
minimise the conflicts of interest. These reforms involve moving away from traditional 
ownership models in which line ministries have ownership responsibilities to 
centralised ownership arrangements 
 
In an apply or explain approach, the principles override specific recommended 
practices. Nevertheless, some principles and recommended practices have been 
incorporated into the companies Act and as such it is mandatory to comply with the 
law. This does not leave room for interpretation. The good news is that South Africa 
has progressed in that area starting from the recommendations made in King II, 
which were subsequently adopted in King III and are now enacted into law. Apart 
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from the Companies Act, other legislation have made provisions for the duties of the 
directors. The Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) is one example that has 
provision for the regulation of the management of the State-Owned Companies and 
defines them as national government business enterprises and national public 
entities.  
Further international examination will be discussed in the next chapter to locate a 
South African approach in the context of the Anglo-American model. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL EXAMINATION 
THE DIVERGENCE BETWEEN U.S. AND U.K. APPROACHES 
5.1 Introduction 
A review of the selected governance codes and principles reveals that apart from the 
content the codes can be differentiated in terms of their compliance requirements. In 
that regards two types of requirements are identified in this Chapter that is voluntary 
adoption, which entails comply or explain in a case of non-adoption, should be 
provided with reasons for that non-adoption as it is being practiced in United 
Kingdom. The other requirement is mandatory adoption which entails that the comply 
or else approach that is being practiced in the United State of America. 
The comparison between the voluntary adoption and mandatory adoption matters 
will be analysed to determine the effectiveness of the reform. In the recent years the 
relative merits of both approaches in their respective order have been subjected to 
intense debate. The comply or explain approach depends on self–regulation as 
recommended by Cadbury Committee Codes. Two key logical conclusions emerge. 
First is that companies should not view compliance with corporate governance codes 
as a substitute to careful thinking as to what is the most appropriate control 
framework for their specific circumstance.245 The second conclusion is that non-
compliance with a particular provision could very well be acceptable if it is 
accompanied by a meaningful explanation as to why it is appropriate in the 
circumstances. A meaningful explanation should set the context, give a convincing 
rationale and describe mitigating action to address any additional risk.246 
 
5.2 Voluntary codes 
In the U.K. Corporate governance practices received increasing attention since the 
1990s, with influential reports issued by the Cadbury Committee (1992), Greenbury 
Committee (1995), Hampel Committee (1998), and Turnbull Committee (2003) and 
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Sir Derek Higgs (2003).247 These reports resulted in various corporate governance 
codes and recommendations, the most recent being the Combined Code of 
Corporate Governance, that was introduced in the UK in 1998, is widely regarded as 
an international benchmark for good corporate governance practice.248 
 
The flexibility it offers to companies, who can choose between complying with its 
principles or explaining stands in sharp contrast to mandatory systems of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US. The merits of such flexibility are thought to lie in its 
ability to encourage companies to adopt the spirit of the Code, rather than the letter 
of the law, whereas a more statutory regime would lead to a \box-ticking" approach 
that would fail to allow for sound deviations from the rule and would not foster 
investors‘ trust.249 The Code fostered compliance, especially in areas not covered by 
its forerunner, the Cadbury Code. For example, such provisions include the 
appointment of a senior independent non-executive director or 12 months service 
contracts for executive directors 
 
The level of compliance with the Code in this instance from the sample of 10; 288 
companies selected indicated that there were 8; 712 cases of compliance resulting in 
an overall frequency of compliance of 84:7%.250 There are 44% of companies which 
did not comply in 2004 on at least one of the principles compared to more than 90% 
in 1998. In 2004, there were 14% not complying on more than 2 principles and 5% 
not complying on more than 3.251 On average, overall compliance per principle 
increases from 76:7% in 1998 to 91:4% in 2004. Compliance increased for all 
principles, except for that relating to the composition of the audit committee, where it 
remained approximately the same. Two out of eight principles have the maximum 
increase in compliance over that period: service contracts (from 35% to 80%) and 
senior non- executive director (from 57% to 92%). Interestingly, these are the two 
principles which were either not present in the Cadbury code (SNED) or present at 
different levels (3 year length of service contract instead of 1 year).252 
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The great achievement of the Code is in the very high number of compliances. As 
compared to a statutory regime a flexible system such as the Combined Code adds 
value if there are conditions under which one size does not fit all. If there is full 
compliance, or if no meaningful explanations are observed in case of non-
compliance, the ―explain" part of the code is ineffective.253 The relative benefit of 
flexibility, relative to a statutory regime, must be therefore commensurate to the 
number of good explanations. 
 
Security Exchange Commissions or the regulators of the public limited liability 
companies (PLCs) in many countries have introduced non-regulatory codes or 
voluntary codes on corporate governance. Code of Best Practices, popularly known 
as the Cadbury guidelines and the subsequent introduction of Combined Code on 
Corporate Governance provide guidelines for the PLCs to improve corporate 
governance practice in the UK.254 PLCs in the Main Market of the London Stock 
Exchange are required to either comply with or explain the reasons for not complying 
with the Combined Code. The comply or explain principle suggests listed companies 
to choose the best practices to suit the size of the firm, future needs and potential 
agency conflicts rather than pushing firms on to a mandatory compliance or to a 
model of ‗one-size fit-all‘. 
 
Colton submits that the comply or explain concept has been hailed as a pragmatic 
tool that can improve corporate governance without the need for inflexible 
burdensome and misguided rules, laws or regulation.255Cadbury codes were 
conceived as a supplement to UK company law and listing requirements in the 
institutional investor-dominated setting of the London market in the early 1990.256The 
Code deliberately focused on the working of one-tier boards and on the role of 
auditors in the United Kingdom.257  
 
Sir John Parker advocates commercial freedom and sound governance rather than 
mandatory compliance of the codes. His believe is based on the fact that the 
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prescribed rigid rules that requires strict adherence could actually be counter-
productive and harm good governance.258He continues to say that business 
environment changes so rapidly and the rules are often out of date before the ink dry 
up.259Regulating behaviour in this way can, perversely, encourage companies to 
merely comply with the letter of the rules rather than making ethical judgements that 
aim to meet their spirit.260 
 
Voluntary regulations, however, can be effective because compliance enables 
companies to satisfy specific requirements, and the level of compliance is influenced, 
if not determined, by the characteristics of these firms.261Consequently, it is 
important to determine the factors that influence compliance with corporate 
governance regulations in a regulated environment. Irrespective of the nature of 
corporate governance regulations, it is apparent that regulation has a positive impact 
on governance compliance.262 
 
5.3 Mandatory corporate governance regulation 
 
For the USA the journey begun in the 1960s and 1970s where these decades were 
characterized by strong managers and weak owners. Corporate law was a matter of 
state rather than federal regulation.263 Only securities law is regulated at the federal 
level, and the emphasis of the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) is usually 
on disclosure rather than substantive provisions regarding company structure.264 
Many investor rights were essentially vested with the board, yet companies have 
great latitude in shaping the structure and powers of boards in practice.  
 
The federal nature of corporate law laid the foundations for managerialism within 
U.S. corporate governance, since shareholders rights remained relatively weak 
under this competitive structure despite the existence of stronger national regulation 
over securities trading.265 In 1974, the SEC began requiring disclosure of the 
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existence of an audit committee and published guidelines about the activities of audit 
committees in 1978. Only in 1977 did the New York Stock Exchange require an audit 
committee with directors independent of management as part of its listing 
requirements. Directors from affiliated firms could serve among these directors 
unless such relationships would interfere with the exercise of independent 
judgement.266 
 
The 1980s saw a huge wave of hostile takeovers that threatened the hegemony of 
U.S. managers.267 Institutional investors and particularly public-sector pension funds 
such as CALPERs became much more active players in corporate governance, 
using their growing blocks to exercise greater voice in corporate management.268 
Power began to shift substantially toward investors due to the rise of new types of 
institutional investors and the advent of hostile takeovers. Institutional investors 
emerged as an important new category of shareholder.269 By the 1990s, the trend 
toward greater shareholder influence continued, but was reshaped by the responses 
of managers. Managers aligned themselves increasingly with the interests of 
shareholders through new forms of executive pay and adopting the ideology of 
shareholder value.270  
Scandals surrounding Enron and Worldcom focused substantial criticism on the U.S. 
corporate governance. Enron was a Texas company that initially specialised in the 
creation of energy markets which allowed utility companies to avoid the use of vertical 
integration strategies and which later expanded into other energy and 
telecommunications markets.271 Despite the appearance of stable revenues and 
increasing profitability, Enron's accounting and auditing practices were such that 
speculative predictions were recorded as future sales, and loans were camouflaged 
as commodities contracts that had already been paid. By the end of 2001 Enron's 
financial situation had become parlous and the energy giant was forced to apply for 
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Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Code protection on 2 December 2001 which cost investors, 
employees and creditors billions of dollars.272 
Ribstein attributes the collapse of Enron and other major companies to agency 
costs and gatekeeper failure. At Enron, the gatekeepers found themselves with 
conflicts of interest which caused them to overlook wrongdoing. First, the common 
behaviour of executives at Enron and other companies was overly-competitive, 
optimistic to the point of delusion, and fundamentally unethical.273 Second, a 
number of new forms of accounting and transaction structures, including derivatives, 
structured financing and special purpose entities, made fraud difficult to identify for 
investors, regulators, auditors and boards of directors. 274Third, investors had been 
lulled into a false sense of security by the new opportunities offered by internet start-
ups and innovative business structures, and showed less scepticism and prudence 
when investing in companies such as Enron.275  
 
These events mounted a strong challenge to the prevailing wisdom about market-
based systems of corporate governance. There was a political reaction that led to 
the development of Sarbanes Oxley (SOX) legislation and subsequent changes in 
SEC listing requirements that altered the way U.S. corporate governance practices 
operate. As such the United States of America chose to codify a significant part of its 
governance in an act of Congress known as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). 
The Act as drafted by U.S. Congressmen Paul Sarbanes and Michael Oxley was 
aimed at improving corporate governance and accountability. It further established 
strict standards for all publicly traded companies in the United States. It does not 
apply to private companies. It is administered by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), which deals with compliance, rules, and requirements. 
The SOX does not only affect the financial side of corporations, but also Information 
Technology departments charged with storing a corporation's electronic records.276 
The Act is not a set of business practices and does not specify how a business 
should store records, rather, it defines which records should be stored and for how 
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long. SOX states that all business records, including electronic records and 
electronic messages, must be saved for not less than five years. The consequences 
for non-compliance are fines, imprisonment or both.277 
This statutory regime is known as ‗comply or else‘. In other words, there are legal 
sanctions for non-compliance. There was a concern raised that with this new regime 
the board and management may focus on compliance at the expense of enterprise. 
To address the concern it was resolved that the duty of the board is to undertake a 
degree of risk for reward and to try to improve the economic value of a company.278 
If the board has a focus on compliance, the attention on its ultimate responsibility 
and performance may be diluted. New U.S. regulation gives greater power and 
institutional scope to the state agencies such as the SEC to regulate important 
‗gatekeepers‘ and professional intermediaries who are central to market-based 
mechanisms of monitoring. 279 Mandatory law matters because it leads to strong 
markets and enables private contracting.280The assumption is that once the regime 
is implemented, the number of actors who deviate from the regime will be much 
smaller than the number of actors that comply.281On this view, mandatory corporate 
governance is necessary just like rules prohibiting insider trading to protect 
investors.282 
 
5.4 Governance and value 
The era after SOX also greatly increased awareness of the differences between the 
U.S. and British approaches to corporate governance. While both are considered to 
be broadly similar shareholder-oriented models, the U.S. regulatory regime is based 
much more on hard law and a regulatory state, unlike the British approach that relies 
more on soft law and self-regulatory mechanisms, such as Codes. The ―one size fits 
all‖ approach of U.S. law sparked debate over the benefits of mandatory rules 
relative to more flexible sets of principles based on enabling set of rules. 283While a 
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wholly mandatory structure may yield slightly better compliance, its other benefits are 
uncertain and its costs are likely much higher. 
 
Corporate governance is about value and is expected to enhance the interests and 
fulfil the aspirations of all stakeholders. The ultimate purpose of all corporation 
governance approaches is to create wealth for shareholders, as it is important to 
recognise that shareholders are indeed the residual stakeholders. As already 
indicated in the previous chapter compliance involve the board of directors to 
exercise their fiduciary responsibility in accordance with the rules and regulations 
that regulates their functions. These fiduciary responsibility or duties are legal 
concepts that form the basis of a board's legal relationship with the company's 
owners. Conversely the shareholders' relationship with the CEO, by contrast, entails 
both a binding contract and the trust of that CEO in controlling the shareholders' 
property. The duty of care, the duty of loyalty and the duty of disclosure forms part of 
distinct CEO‘s fiduciary duties and legal responsibilities to his company's 
shareholders. The duty of care refers to the CEO's responsibility to consider all of the 
available information relevant to business decisions, including the advice of experts 
and employees. The duty of care also includes the responsibility to understand and 
evaluate the company's day to day operations and the terms of agreements.284 The 
duty of loyalty requires that a director must act in good faith and must not allow his 
personal interests to prevail over the interests of the corporation.285 This includes the 
responsibility to avoid conflicts of interest. Finally, the fiduciary duty of disclosure 
mandates that a CEO fully inform both the board of directors and the shareholders 
about the major issues facing the business 
 
The obligations towards the contractual stakeholders such as customers, 
employees, vendors, creditors and the society get precedence over the interests of 
the shareholders. The contribution of other stakeholders to the success of the 
corporation is not less important than that of the shareholders. Unless the company 
blends a harmonious relationship among all the stakeholders, it may jeopardise its 
ability to create wealth on a sustained basis. The society benefits from receipt of 
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taxes, generation of employment, and social commitment displayed as well as public 
projects undertaken by the company. Lenders benefit from safety of interest and 
principal, and they also gain from enhancement of their portfolio quality through 
improvement in the quality of their lending/investment portfolios. Employees benefit 
from salaries and benefits, and through stability of employment. The residual 
belongs to shareholders majority and minority and are shared appropriately. The 
board and management are expected to create value for all the stakeholders. Hence, 
governance processes must be such that wealth created is distributed across all 
classes of stakeholders in proportion to their contribution, and in keeping with market 
and business practices. It is in this perspective that the quality of management 
should be enhanced so that it is able to adapt to match the dynamics of the business 
environment. Eventually, all these decisions of companies impact the stability of their 
future wealth creation.  
 
In South Africa, the King reports provided guidelines for both private companies and 
SOEs. Some of the principles were partially codified and that has placed South 
Africa in the top rank of emerging market economies that follow corporate 
governance codes. Even then the question can be raised as to whether there is 
sufficient institutional capacity to implement the codes. The said will be addressed in 
the following chapter. 
 
5.5 Global initiatives on corporate governance 
(a) World Bank Group and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development  
The World Bank Group and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development drafted the Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-
Owned Enterprises which were adopted since 2005 as an internationally-
agreed standard on how governments should exercise ownership of SOEs. 
The SOE Guidelines are being reviewed and revised in 2014 to take into 
account developments since their adoption and the experiences of the 
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growing number of countries that have taken steps to implement their 
recommendation.286 
(b) Global Corporate Governance Forum (GCGF) 
 
The Global Corporate Governance Forum (GCGF) co-founded by the World 
Bank Group and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development is an advocate, a supporter, and a disseminator of high 
standards and practices of corporate governance in developing countries and 
transition economies. Through its activities, the Forum actively supports 
regional and local initiatives that address corporate governance by leveraging 
institutional support for reforms and initiatives that build local capacity and by 
making available technical and advisory assistance drawn from its wide 
network of international and private sector expertise. The Forum's donors 
include the International Finance Corporation, and the governments of 
Canada, France, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.287 
 
(c) African Capital Markets Forum 
The African Capital Markets Forum undertook a study on the state of Corporate 
Governance in Africa. Regional conferences were held in Kampala, Uganda, 
in June 1998 and September 1999 to create awareness and promote regional 
co-operation in matters of corporate governance. At the June 1998 
Conference it was resolved that each member state be encouraged to 
develop both a framework and a code of best practice, to promote national 
corporate governance and that efforts be made to harmonise corporate 
governance in the East Africa region under the auspices of the East Africa Co-
operation and through the establishment of a regional apex body to promote 
corporate governance.288 
 
(d) Corporate Governance In Africa  
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The African Development Bank has fully recognized over the last few years 
that good corporate governance is essential to Africa‘s future development. 
The Bank formulated a Bank Group Policy on Good Governance at the end of 
1999 and related Operational Guidelines in 2001. These documents aimed to 
provide a flexible framework for mainstreaming governance into Bank 
operations and to pave the way for African countries to enhance their 
governance stance. One major outcome of the guidelines has been the 
formulation and implementation of the Country Governance Profile (CGP) as 
a Bank instrument. The CGP is designed to help the Bank to identify 
weaknesses in governance practices and to develop appropriate capacity-
building programs. Identified shortcomings are addressed through specific 
projects/programs, including a new quick-disbursing instrument, viz. the 
Policy-Based Lending on Governance (PBLG).289 
 
5.6 Corporate Governance in Commonwealth Authorities 
The 56 countries in the Commonwealth, including South Africa and the 27 states in 
the EU including the United Kingdom, have opted for a code of principles and 
practices on a comply or explain‗ basis, in addition to certain governance issues that 
are legislated. The Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance was 
subsequently established and developed the ―Principles for Corporate Governance 
in the Commonwealth, CACG Guidelines‖. These were adopted at the November 
1999 Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Durban.290 
5.7 CONCLUSION 
 
Besides international efforts, such as the corporate governance principles of 
organisations like OECD, recent surveys have identified well over hundred national 
corporate governance codes adopted by various organisations. One can add to this 
that there are seemingly endless corporate governance pronouncements by 
individual companies and organisations. These sets of rules, whether international, 
national, or company-specific, are all strangely similar. Yet corporate governance 
practices differ substantially across countries and companies. And there are still 
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many concerns regarding the effectiveness of corporate governance rules in 
transition and developed countries, as well as many developed countries.  
 
In other words, the written rules are not adhered to and pronouncements of SOEs 
are not being followed up by actions. In great part this is because rules and 
regulations are not enforced and increasingly policymakers have come to realise that 
enforcement more than regulations is the key problem, at least in transition and 
developing countries. For sustained development to take place, governance has to 
operate on many levels at the national level, local government level, the level of 
N.G.O.S. and at the corporate level.291SOEs have to operate within the overall policy 
framework set by Government. The rationale for State ownership of commercial 
enterprises is the belief that it is essential to provide important public services that 
would otherwise not be met from a purely financial or economic standpoint, as well 
as the belief in some quarters that they help to reduce inequalities and promote a 
fairer society.292 
 
SOEs overall impact on economic performance and the application of good 
governance practices stands high on the agenda. Links between policy frameworks, 
corporate governance practices and economic outcomes, as well as the roles of 
policymakers and the SOEs respectively is of paramount important. Hence there is a 
great deal of work to be done and this will be addressed in the next chapter.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
291Wolfenden J, one time President of the World Bank 
292OECD Guidelines On Corporate Governance Of State-Owned Enterprises.(2005) 23 
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CHAPTER SIX 
“If a country does not have a reputation for strong corporate governance practices, capital will flow elsewhere. If investors are 
not confident with the level of disclosure, capital will flow elsewhere. If a country opts for lax accounting and reporting 
standards, capital will flow elsewhere.”
293
 
 
6. 1 Conclusion 
 
The main objective of this research has been to draw attention to the potential 
importance or the impact of corporate governance reforms on better SOEs 
governance. An analysis of the history of South African SOEs, the form and effect of 
their reforms, the legal and regulatory framework of SOEs, ownership function, 
relationships with respective industry, the stakeholders and shareholder perspectives 
on corporate governance, the compliance with legislative prescripts, their 
performance, transparency and disclosure, and the role of the board of directors are 
amongst other topics that have been explored in this research. An overview of the 
governance structure and the role of the state over SOEs with reference to good 
corporate governance principles have also been examined. The interrogation of 
whether such reforms have inspired the improvement of corporate standards and 
behaviour has also been covered. Lastly the scrutiny of the positive and negative 
consequences that could strengthen the corporate governance regulations and 
assist in determining the best possible model for South African SOEs has also been 
probed.  
Sketching the possibilities and limits of corporate reform in the current climate of 
crisis and change has been a learning exercise. What could have been done in the 
past and what can perhaps be done now, given the very different business 
experiences has assisted in providing the possible solutions. SOEs suffered the cost 
of poor corporate governance in the form of lower valuations, reduced access to 
equity finance, and difficulties with respect to succession planning and accessing 
outside talent. Equally, the economy has paid through reduced productivity, as 
investment funds were allocated less efficiently. If the situation is attended to that 
measure could play an important role in improving corporate governance 
arrangements. When codes and principles are used as a national standard or as an 
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explicit substitute for legal or regulatory provisions, market credibility requires that 
their status in terms of coverage, implementation, compliance and sanctions is 
clearly specified. 294 
The regulatory reforms should not be used as an over-reaction or address symptoms 
of a problem while ignoring underlying causes as that can be costly and counter-
productive. Government‘s role in restoring corporate integrity and market confidence 
without stifling the strength that underlies effective and efficient SOEs cannot be over 
emphasised. The determinants of corporate governance compliance have revealed 
that the existence of corporate governance regulation is indeed a significant factor in 
company‘s compliance levels.  
 
Despite South Africa‘s reforms aiming at achieving more transparent ownership and 
less ―entrenched‖ management, the outcome in terms of the distribution of corporate 
power in the economy is mixed. It is generally assumed that a regulatory 
environment would result in enhanced corporate governance because companies 
are meant to comply with the relevant regulations, and the literature shows that 
regulation has a positive impact on corporate governance compliance. Regulation 
does enhance the quality of audited reports followed by organisational performance. 
The performance-governance relationship does depend on whether or not one takes 
into account the endogenous nature of the relation between governance and 
performance. The inter-relationships among corporate governance, management 
turnover, corporate performance, corporate capital structure, and corporate 
ownership structure suggest that there is a correlation of the relationship between 
corporate governance and performance. 
 
The presence of an effective corporate governance system within SOEs helps to 
provide a degree of confidence that is necessary for the proper functioning of a 
market economy. Numerous theories have been proposed on corporate governance 
best practice, none more popular are the shareholder and stakeholder theories. 
These theories have assisted in determining the best possible theory that can assist 
South Africa in tackling poor corporate governance as it has contributed largely to 
most SOEs failures, which have in turn posed significant public costs and 
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consequences due to their impact on applicable systems and the broader 
macroeconomic implications, and that have also tainted risk and negative impact on 
their productivity. These concerns over South African SOEs corporate governance 
standards have been very clear and the status quo is no longer acceptable. The 
demand for accountability and responsibility in corporate behaviour goes without 
saying. Even though it will take more than just leadership to restore public 
confidence in South African SOEs in order to ensure their ongoing viability, effective 
government action in the form of robust monitoring or oversight role, independence 
of the auditing system, and stepped up law enforcement needs to be employed.  
 
The stakeholder theory is ideal for South Africa in that it emphasises the need for the 
corporation to define in the broader sense the mere maximisation of shareholder 
welfare. The theory entails that managers should internalise all stakeholders‘ welfare 
in order to cater for their needs. The outcome should not only depend on the choices 
made by one person, but also on the strategies selected by other participating 
parties. Ethical treatment of stakeholders if consistently practised will benefit the 
SOEs because trust relationships are built with stakeholders. In order to achieve the 
maximum efficiency in the costs of social association the long-term contractual 
associations between a company and its stakeholders are necessary. 
 
For sustainable development to take place, governance has to operate on all levels. 
State-ownership has to operate within the overall policy framework set by 
Government. The rationale for State ownership of commercial enterprises is that it is 
essential to provide important public services that would otherwise not be met from a 
purely financial or economic standpoint so that they help to reduce inequalities and 
promote a fairer society. 
 
From the perspective of the political economy of corporate governance, the benefits 
of state ownership of 100 percent of a firm‘s equity holdings, as opposed to a lower 
threshold, are twofold. First there should be an elimination of the typical agency 
problems associated with multi-owners whole ownership neutralizes the 
government‘s interest and influence in most legal provisions that govern the internal 
affairs rules of corporations. Second the whole ownership creates superior incentives 
for the implementation of efficient corporate governance rules. The government has 
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an incentive to implement a legal regime that increases SOE firm value proposition 
in order to maximize its efficiency. In order to mitigate the state‘s conflicts of interest 
in corporate law-making the whole government ownership may in fact be preferable 
to partial ownership. 
 
Uncovering the area where the interests of managers diverge from those of the 
interests of shareholders and the consequence has helped in suggesting that the 
State should clarify the function and ensure that each group should exercise within a 
governance structure. The State ownership function which is responsible for defining 
the ownership policy and high-level objectives for SOEs must be clearly articulated 
to avoid confusion. The board which is charged by the State with overseeing the 
development of a strategy to achieve the state‘s objectives and monitoring of 
progress must also be clear. The executive management who propose a strategy 
and who are accountable to the board for implementing the strategic plan must be 
given space to do that. 
In view of the above the board is at the centre of the governance of the SOEs. As 
such it carries the ultimate responsibility for SOEs performance, and it has the 
authority and autonomy to make decisions that determine performance. It also acts 
as the intermediary between the State and the SOEs on behalf of the owners. They 
can only be able to do that if they are trusted and left to do just that. 
 
6. 2 Recommendations 
Having deliberated on the route that South African SOEs can follow in terms of 
redeeming its reputation taking in consideration the work that has been done in the 
previous five chapters, the following serve as recommendations for the purpose of 
this research: 
 
(a) The key strategy of providing the board of directors with greater powers 
and the autonomy to exercise their powers and to enhance board 
composition in order to ensure that they have the necessary skills to 
achieve their goals cannot be overemphasised. Ensuring the 
independence of board members including shielding them from political 
intervention will assist the proper functioning of SOEs. The manner in 
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which the government influences the course of SOEs should be looked at. 
CEO-Chair separation in most cases is significantly positively correlated 
with better coexistent and subsequent operating performance of SOEs.  
 
(b) Clarity on the State‘s ownership function in enhancing SOE boards to 
create a shared vision for the governance reforms that are to be achieved 
and to clearly communicate in line with the SOEs policies and objectives 
can better serve South Africa. This is another way of saying that reform of 
corporate governance has to be reasonable in the context of what is and 
not simply what ought to be, and resonant with larger social goals that 
enjoy broad support. How the ownership function of the State is organised 
can influence the overall investment environment. This function needs to 
be clearly identified and separated from other state functions, including 
regulatory oversight to help ensure a level playing field, especially with 
regard to complying with laws and regulations. It will also help to ensure 
that the State, while being an active and informed owner, does not 
interfere in the day-to-day management of SOEs, leaving their boards with 
operational autonomy to realise their defined objectives and fulfil their 
function of strategic guidance and monitoring of management.  
 
(c) Board members should be nominated through transparent processes, 
based on competencies and experience and should act in the best 
interests of the company as a whole, rather than as individual 
representatives of the constituencies that appointed them.295 
 
(d) While the objectives of good governance, namely creation, protection and 
equitable distribution of shareholder value, have long been recognized, 
their full achievement in practice has been dogged by challenges 
emanating from various sources like dominant shareholders, autocratic 
executive managements, ineffective independent auditors, inefficient 
enforcement mechanisms, and so on.296 Standing out prominently among 
these challenges is the potential for controlling shareholder dominance 
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often abetted, unwittingly or otherwise, by inefficient board surveillance 
over the executive.297 What should happen is that there should be a clarity 
regarding the roles and responsibilities of the board, individual members, 
the chief executive officer and the Minister. Appropriate instruments should 
also be established to describe responsibilities for the board collectively 
and for individual members that conform to the public sector principles. 
 
(e) Another recommendation is to infuse SOEs with private sector discipline, 
competitive market pressures, and clear consequences for non-
performance. This forces SOEs to meet their costs of capital and divest 
any activities that are not commercially viable. In restructuring the public 
sector to carry out national goals the balance of evidence will guide the 
decision for or against various economic policy measures. Government 
must therefore consider increasing the public sector in strategic areas 
through purchasing a shareholding in companies, establishing new public 
corporations or joint ventures with the private sector, and reducing the 
public sector in certain areas in ways that enhance efficiency while 
ensuring the protection of both consumers and the rights and employment 
of workers.  
 
(f) A high level of shareholder, manager and board of directors involvement in 
the decision making process should suggests the existence of active 
corporate monitoring and governance, which could in turn reduce agency 
problems and lead to improved enterprise performance. At the same time 
it should imply a lower relative level of state intervention. With regard to 
the control variables, it seems worth mentioning that none of the new 
formal organs of corporate governance established by new Companies Act 
seems to have a decisively positive influence on company performance. 
Ongoing efforts of South African authorities to improve internal corporate 
governance mechanisms therefore seem to be much in line with the 
current realities in its listed firms.  
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(g) While ownership matters, policies and institutions matter just as much. For 
each transaction, proper planning, execution, monitoring, and assessment 
are necessary. Transparency is an integral part of corporate governance. 
It includes timely access to relevant information, respect for rule of law and 
procedures, as well as control. Lack of transparency often leads to 
allegations of corruption and loss of investor confidence. In this regards 
the State should be seen to foster economic growth through the creation of 
environmental conditions under which these SOEs should freely operate. 
Meddling into the day to day running of the SOEs reduces the SOEs to 
focus in achieving their mandate. 
 
(h) The government‘s involvement in the domains of personnel, financial and 
strategic SOEs‘ decisions yields negative and significant coefficients, 
suggesting a detrimental impact. The said should be left to the board of 
directors to appointment the suitable candidates for the job.  
 
(i) Well-designed training programmes for board members as well as the 
government ownership representatives enhances channels of 
communications between CEOs and the boards. As such this much be 
encouraged and practised. 
 
(j) The establishment and maintenance of a legal and regulatory framework 
for the governance and management of SOEs can serve as good 
environment that is conducive to them optimising their performance. This 
notion was supported by the Minister of Finance Mr Nhlanhla Nene who 
voiced out a concern that government lacks the legal instrument to 
properly intervene in the affairs of the state-owned companies when things 
go awry and made suggestion that a need has arisen to explore legislative 
changes in order to empower the state to exercise such interventions.298  
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6.3 Future studies 
Consideration of this governance measure by future accounting and finance 
researchers would enhance the comparability of these research findings. 
 
Total words composition of 30 558. 
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